



HATE SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
Charlotte H. Taylor*
The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must 
be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of 
its content. 
—Justice Antonin Scalia, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul1
Americans recently lived through the year of the noose.  In De-
cember 2006, a series of events in Jena, Louisiana pushed the noose 
into the foreground of the national consciousness.  White students at 
the local high school hung three nooses in a tree called “the white 
tree,” after the race of the students who regularly gathered under it.  
The nooses were apparently intended to warn African American stu-
dents away from sitting there.  Six African American students had re-
taliated by assaulting several of their white classmates.  The white stu-
dents who hung the nooses were suspended for three days and 
assigned a week of disciplinary classes, while local authorities charged 
the six African American students involved in the assault with a vari-
ety of serious crimes, including attempted murder.2  Civil rights advo-
cates were enraged at the treatment of the “Jena Six” and staged a 
number of protests.3
The incident touched off not only a round of debate over race re-
lations in America but also, it appears, a spate of hate speech inci-
dents featuring nooses.4  An African American professor at Columbia 
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 1 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992). 
 2 The students were also initially charged as adults.  See Richard G. Jones, In Louisiana, a 
Tree, a Fight and a Question of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at A14. 
 3 Peter Whoriskey, Thousands Protest Blacks’ Treatment, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2007, at A1. 
 4 See Marisol Bello, “Jena 6” Case in Louisiana Spurs Copycats, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 2007, at 
3A; Darryl Fears, In Jena and Beyond, Nooses Return as a Symbol of Hate, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 
2007, at A1. 
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University Teachers College found a noose pinned to her door.5  A 
noose appeared slung over a tree branch near an African American 
student community center at the University of Maryland.6  Nooses 
were found at two locations in the town of Hempstead on Long Is-
land, New York, including at the police department.7  Nooses were 
hung from the lockers of two black supervisors in the New York City 
Parks Department.8  At a construction site in Philadelphia, an em-
ployee allegedly shook a noose at an African American worker and 
said he wanted to hang someone.9  Many more such incidents re-
ceived media attention,10 and no doubt still more took place.  Cap-
ping off the year, in January 2008, a golf commentator remarked that 
Tiger Woods’s competitors should “lynch” him.  She issued an apol-
ogy, and her network suspended her.11  The controversy was pro-
longed when Golfweek magazine, reporting on the story, ran a photo-
graph of a noose on its front cover.  The action provoked a second 
outcry, and the editor responsible for the image was fired.12
The series of incidents provoked unsurprisingly strong reactions 
from African American leaders and advocates for civil rights.  The 
 5 Elissa Gootman & Al Baker, Noose on Door at Columbia Prompts Campus Protest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 2007, at B3; Rich Schapiro, Alison Gendar & Tracy Connor, “Despicable Act” on Co-
lumbia’s Campus, DAILY NEWS (New York), Oct. 10, 2007, at 5. 
 6 Avis Thomas-Lester, Racial Incident Leads to Dialogue at U. Md., WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2007, 
at B5. 
 7 Bill Hutchinson, Cops Probe Nooses Hung on Forklift at L.I. Garage, DAILY NEWS (New York),  
Oct. 18, 2007, at 18; Collin Nash, Three Suspended in Noose Case, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 2008, at 
A18.  In the nearby town of North Hempstead, highway department workers were later 
disciplined for tying equipment together with a noose.  Id. 
 8 Michael Amon, Nooses Found at Rockaway Beach Work Site, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 28, 
2007, at A32. 
 9 Annette John-Hall, Of Nooses and Swastikas and Living Tokens of Hatred, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Oct. 19, 2007, at B1. 
 10 The foregoing list is by no means exhaustive.  See, e.g., Discovery of Nooses Prompts Call for 
Military Investigation, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2007, at A2 (reporting that in Connecticut, 
“[n]ooses were left in a bag belonging to a black Coast Guard cadet and in the office of a 
white officer who conducted race relations training”); Erin Einhorn et al., Noose Left at 
Qns. Park, DAILY NEWS (New York), Oct. 24, 2007, at 24 (reporting a police investigation 
of a noose found hanging from a tree in a park); Susan Kinzie, Hanging Doll Investigated as 
Hate Crime, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2008, at B6 (noting the investigation of a black doll hang-
ing from a noose at the University of Richmond); Dave McKibben, Nooses at Cal State Full-
erton Denounced, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at B4 (“The discovery of several nooses at a to-
lerance rally has upset the normally tranquil Cal State Fullerton campus.”); Jennifer 
Medina, Noose Sent to Black Principal at Brooklyn School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at B2 
(stating that an African American principal received a noose and a “racially charged let-
ter” including racial slurs and the words “‘white power forever’”). 
 11 See Jaime Cardenas, Tilghman Suspended for Woods “Lynch” Comment, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 
2008, at D6. 
 12 Richard Sandomir, Golfweek Fires Editor Because of Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at D7. 
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Reverend Al Sharpton called for Congress to expand U.S. hate crime 
law.13  On the other side, free speech advocates cautioned against 
censorship as a way of addressing the problem.  Opined one editorial-
ist, “Americans appear to have forgotten the difference between hate-
ful speech and hateful action.  And when we lose sight of that distinc-
tion, we lose what should be most distinctive about America itself.”14
The debate over how to address hate speech is by now familiar, 
each side entrenched in its position.  Since the 1980s, when scholarly 
and political advocacy for the regulation of hate speech began to 
gather momentum, debate on the topic has been strongly polarized, 
with one side advocating regulation in the name of equality and the 
other denouncing regulation as censorship.  This Article proposes a 
middle way:  government speech. 
The two sides in the debate over hate speech might be called the 
anti-subordination camp and the free speech camp.  Those in the 
anti-subordination camp understand hate speech to be a means of 
perpetuating systematic discrimination and oppression of minority 
groups.  They are skeptical of the First Amendment and its emphasis 
on unfettered debate and protection of unpopular speech; they see 
“freedom of speech” as a screen that protects racism, homophobia, 
misogyny, and other forms of discrimination.  They urge that the 
equality values of the Fourteenth Amendment must not be sacrificed 
in the name of the First Amendment.  Those in the free speech camp 
are, for their part, skeptical of the proposition that it is possible or 
advisable to regulate only that speech which contributes to subordi-
nation.  They point out, first, that defining a category of “hate 
speech” will be difficult:  how can you ban racist speech without fear 
of chilling a protected discussion of racial difference?  They also ob-
serve that allowing the government to suppress a particular viewpoint, 
even one that is unequivocally condemned by a majority of the popu-
lation, opens the door for further government censorship.  The right 
way to counter these hateful ideas is to allow them to be tested in the 
field of open debate, where they will eventually be refuted conclu-
sively and wither away.  Moreover, those in the free speech camp are 
inclined to see any law passed to protect a particular group from ver-
bal insult as a political sop to minorities, a pacifying measure that 
plays to the ignoble demands of race politics while diverting attention 
 13 Devlin Barrett, House Panel Weighs Jena 6 Case on Tuesday, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 16, 2007.
 14 Jonathan Zimmerman, Op-Ed., Hateful Speech Isn’t Hateful Action, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(New York), Sept. 27, 2007, at 9. 
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from more fundamental problems.  And so debate between the two 
camps has ended at an impasse. 
For a number of years, legal doctrine took the free speech line, ef-
fectively rendering further debate moot.  In 1985, the Seventh Circuit 
voided an anti-pornography law that was aimed at images that showed 
women enjoying sexual subordination.15  The 1992 Supreme Court 
decision R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul then struck down the Minnesota 
city’s anti-hate speech law as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimina-
tion.16  The door appeared to be closed on efforts to use law to regu-
late hateful language, symbols, and images until the 2003 decision 
Virginia v. Black, when the Court found that an anti-cross burning 
statute did not constitute impermissible content or viewpoint dis-
crimination.17  The Supreme Court made extensive findings about 
the long history linking cross burning to racially-motivated violence 
and found that Virginia could ban burning a cross with intent to in-
timidate as a “particularly virulent form of intimidation.”18
In the wake of 2007’s proliferation of hate speech incidents involv-
ing nooses, a number of state and city legislatures have introduced or 
passed laws proposing to ban the display of nooses with the intent to 
intimidate.19  These measures are being developed to conform to 
 15 Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 
(1986).
 16 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 17 538 U.S. 343 (2003).  The Court reconciled its holding with R.A.V. by emphasizing that 
R.A.V. had noted that content discrimination that “consists entirely of the very reason the 
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable” did not run afoul of the First Amendment, 
id. at 361 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388), and by finding that the statute at issue did not 
draw any distinction based on viewpoint because it did not turn on the motivation behind 
the intent to intimidate, Black, 538 U.S. at 362–63.  The Court therefore disagreed with 
the Virginia Supreme Court’s finding that “the Virginia cross-burning statute ‘is analyti-
cally indistinguishable from the ordinance found unconstitutional in R.A.V.’”  Id. at 351 
(quoting Black v. Commonwealth, 533 S.E.2d 738, 742 (2001)).
 18 Black, 538 U.S. at 352–57, 363. 
 19 Connecticut passed a law making it a crime to place a noose on public property or on 
private property without written consent of the owner if the perpetrator has the intent to 
intimidate or harass another person on the basis of religion, national origin, alienage, 
color, race, sex, sexual orientation, blindness, or physical disability.  2008 Conn. Acts 185 
(Reg. Sess.)(amending CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-58 (2008)); see House Passes Noose Bill, 
ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 24, 2008.  New York State passed a law that makes it aggravated har-
assment in the first degree to draw or display a noose, “commonly exhibited as a symbol 
of racism and intimidation,” on public or private property without the express permission 
of the owner, with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person on the 
basis of race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, dis-
ability, or sexual orientation.  2008 N.Y. Laws 3020 (amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 
(2008)); see Law Makes Noose Display a Felony, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at B2.  The noose 
will join the swastika and the burning cross on the list of symbols the display of which 
(with the intent to harass or intimidate) elevates a crime from second- to first-degree ag-
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Black’s rule,20 and they demonstrate that regulation is still the method 
of choice for combating hate speech.  We can expect that opponents 
of hate speech regulation will continue to oppose such laws.  If Black’s 
rule is tested in further litigation, the question of what forms of legal 
regulation of hateful speech are constitutionally permissible may re-
ceive a new or more fully defined doctrinal answer.  But that answer is 
not likely to satisfy both the anti-subordination and free speech 
camps.  Outright regulation of hate speech will never resolve the 
theoretical and doctrinal differences between those who advocate the 
principle of anti-subordination and those who advocate the values of 
free speech.  Meanwhile, America’s commitment to protecting hate 
speech makes it an anomaly among liberal democracies.21
gravated harassment.  Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (2008) (defining aggravated har-
assment in the second degree), with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (2008) (defining aggravated 
harassment in the first degree).  A similar bill passed the Maryland House but died in the 
State’s Senate.  H.R. 41, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/
2008rs/billfile/hb0041.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (tracing the bill’s legislative his-
tory and noting that it passed the House but did not get past the hearings stage in the 
Senate).  The Maryland bill would have prohibited placing a noose or a swastika on pub-
lic or private property with the intent to threaten or intimidate any person or group with-
out the permission of the owner.  See id.; Maryland Lawmakers Add Nooses, Swastikas to Hate 
Crime Law, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 19, 2008.  A bill was introduced in the Missouri Senate that 
would add nooses to the existing statute criminalizing burning a cross with intent to in-
timidate.  S.B. 763, 94th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).  North Carolina passed 
a bill specifying that nooses are included in the category of “exhibits” that it is unlawful to 
display with the intent to intimidate others.  2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 197 (amending N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.12 to 14-12.15).  Louisiana passed a law prohibiting the display of a 
noose with intent to intimidate on the property of another, a highway, or a public place.  
H.R. 726, Reg. Sess. (La. 2008) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.5 (2010)).  
Among the cities that considered legislation are:  Philadelphia (see Vernon Clark, Add 
Minority Workers, Unions Told, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2007, at B9 (noting that the “City 
Council unanimously passed Councilman Darrell L. Clarke’s measure to punish the dis-
play of hate symbols, including nooses, burning crosses and swastikas”); Jeff Shields, Dis-
playing Symbols of Intimidation Could Bring Jail Time:  A City Council Bill Would Prohibit Dis-
playing Nooses, Swastikas, and Other Tokens of Hatred, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 26, 2007, at B4); 
Washington D.C.; and New Orleans (see Marisol Bello, Racial Harassment Cases Rise Sharply, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2008, at 3A (noting that bills had been introduced in New Orleans 
and Washington, D.C.)). 
 20 The state laws all ban the display of a noose with the intent to intimidate, consistent with 
Black’s holding that in order to be proscribable as a “true threat,” a speaker’s use of a 
burning cross must be carried out with intent to threaten the target.  Black, 538 U.S. at 
359–60, 365.  Maryland’s, New York’s and Connecticut’s laws also contain a trespassing 
element:  in order to fall under the statute, the noose must be displayed on public or pri-
vate property without the owner’s permission.  Connecticut’s and New York’s laws, how-
ever, do contain an element of viewpoint discrimination that might run afoul of R.A.V.:  
they ban the display of a noose with intent to intimidate on the basis of the target’s race, 
religion, or sexual orientation (among other characteristics). 
 21 See Adam Liptak, Freedom to Offend Outside U.S., Hate Speech Can be Costly, N.Y. TIMES, June 
12, 2008, at A1 (contrasting attitudes toward free speech in America with those in Europe 
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But government speech offers a third path.  In the aftermath of 
the controversy provoked by the Golfweek noose cover, President 
George W. Bush made a public statement emphasizing the powerful 
symbolic value of the noose.  “The noose is not a symbol of prairie 
justice, but of gross injustice,” he said at an event celebrating the ca-
reer of Congressman John Lewis.  “Displaying one is not a harmless 
prank.  And ‘lynching’ is not a word to be mentioned in jest.”22  
Bush’s remarks represent an attempt to advise the nation of the his-
torically determined meaning of the noose and to admonish against 
using the symbol in an ignorant or ill-considered manner.  Those 
who may have displayed nooses as a joke, he hoped, would take his 
words to heart.23  The effectiveness of Bush’s message can, of course, 
be debated.  But his gesture points to a third possibility for address-
ing the problem of hate speech, one that may split the difference be-
tween the dangers of language regulation and the rigidity of First 
Amendment absolutism. 
As the Supreme Court recently confirmed in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, government speech is unfettered by the First Amendment 
prohibition on content- and viewpoint-discrimination.24  Government 
speech can be used deliberately to discourage and deter the use of 
hateful language.  The government speaks to its citizens in myriad 
ways:  through the speech of elected officials, through the dissemina-
tion of information, by exercising regulatory and editorial control 
over channels of mass communication, and by educating the nation’s 
students.  It communicates its messages not only directly, through 
and Canada).  Recently, Jeremy Waldron revisited the dilemma in his review of Anthony 
Lewis’s book, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate:  “It is not clear to me that Europeans 
are mistaken when they say that a liberal democracy must take affirmative responsibility 
for protecting the atmosphere of mutual respect against certain forms of vicious at-
tack. . . .  [T]he position of minority groups as equal members of a multiracial, multieth-
nic, or religiously pluralistic society is not something that anyone can take for granted.”  
Jeremy Waldron, Free Speech & the Menace of Hysteria, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 29, 2008 
(reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE:  A BIOGRAPHY 
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007)).  Waldron noted that America’s commitment to pro-
tecting hate speech makes it an outlier among liberal democracies. 
 22 Michael Abramowitz & Hamil R. Harris, At Black History Month Event, Bush Denounces Noose 
Displays, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2008, at A2; Steven Lee Myers, Bush, at Commemoration, Says 
Nooses are Symbol of “Gross Injustice,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A18. 
 23 The idea that the spate of noose incidents in 2007 was largely a series of pranks or stupid 
jokes was a common and much-debated theme in media coverage of and commentary on 
the events.  See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Racial Crisis?  Or Just Rope in the Hands of Fools?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A37; Adrienne T. Washington, Noose Is No Prank, and Not To 
Be Tolerated, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at B2; Yolanda Woodlee, Ex-Worker Calls Noose 
Incident an Overblown, “Stupid Prank,” WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2008, at B5. 
 24 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
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statements and advertisements, but also indirectly, through such 
channels as subsidizing private speakers and disallowing certain 
speakers in fora it controls.  In nearly all its operations, it takes posi-
tions on contested social and political issues. 
Government speech is so pervasive and powerful that commenta-
tors have feared that it is too effective as a means of influencing the 
citizenry.  Social liberals have worried that the government will use its 
powerful voice to enforce a conservative orthodoxy.  Free speech ab-
solutists have worried that government speech, directly or indirectly, 
inhibits private speech.  The predominant focus of the existing litera-
ture on government speech, therefore, is on how appropriately to 
limit it:  which doctrinal tests will most effectively distinguish between 
“valid” government expression (however defined) and unacceptable 
government cooptation or domination of individual voices?25
Less well explored are ways in which government speech might be 
a normative good rather than a necessary evil.26  While a number of 
scholars have acknowledged that the government does play an essen-
tial and positive role in educating the citizenry, they generally do so 
on the way to advancing proposals about how to prevent government 
speech from encroaching on individual expression and autonomy.  
This Article observes that government speech offers a valuable oppor-
tunity to influence social meanings and affect norms of conduct—
and, moreover, that it is a fact of life that the government does influ-
ence social meanings and affect norms of conduct—and makes the 
case that this opportunity can be more deliberately and effectively 
exploited.  This Article will explore the possibilities and limitations of 
using government speech to reduce the incidence of hate speech and 
so offer a way out of the impasse scholarly discussion has so far 
reached.  While before, arguments for regulation have been opposed 
by arguments against it, this Article proposes to pair an argument for 
intervention with a permissible mode of intervention. 
Precisely because government speech is uniquely pervasive and 
persuasive, it can be used effectively to disseminate a message; and 
 25 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698–99 (1970); 
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1377, 1384 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free 
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 545 (1996). 
 26 The two studies that have most extensively explored the positive value of government 
speech are Joseph Tussman’s Government and the Mind (1977) and Mark Yudof’s When 
Government Speaks (1983).  They have primarily discussed the role the government can 
play in inculcating civic virtues generally.  See infra note 246 and accompanying text.  
Tussman notes that his project “evokes such immediate and powerful hostility that I have 
become a bit gun shy.”  JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND, at v (1977). 
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because government expression is not binding on citizens as laws and 
court decisions are, it does not amount to impermissible content or 
viewpoint regulation.  The anti-subordination and free speech camps 
have been at loggerheads not over the substantive value of hateful 
language but over the wisdom and constitutionality of using regula-
tions to ban it.  The predominant emphasis of First Amendment doc-
trine is on protecting citizens from direct restraints on their expres-
sion:  the state may not intervene in public discourse to silence or 
disadvantage a certain viewpoint.  But government speech does not 
operate by placing affirmative limits on the expression of individuals; 
it can throw normative weight against hate speech but stop short of 
establishing a rigid prohibition on it.  Government speech may there-
fore offer a way to address hate speech without running afoul of First 
Amendment values. 
Because government speech stops short of a prohibition, it may 
not satisfy those in the anti-subordination camp who desire a strong, 
affirmative intervention against hate speech.  Regulation alone, these 
advocates may argue, is a powerful enough measure to combat it.  On 
the other side, it may be objected that the fact that non-prohibitive 
government actions taken to deter hate speech are permissible under 
First Amendment doctrine does not necessarily mean that they are 
desirable in light of free speech values.  Many commentators have 
pointed out that First Amendment rights may be compromised as 
readily through affirmative as through negative measures:  the gov-
ernment can silence speech and distort debate by conditioning its of-
fer of subsidies on an individual’s agreement to communicate, or not 
to communicate, a given message.27  Such observers will be suspicious 
of any proposal that the government deliberately sets out to deter ex-
pression, even or especially through non-regulatory methods.  A cen-
tral tenet of First Amendment theory, after all, is that the government 
cannot play favorites among viewpoints. 
These concerns are valid.  But the overwhelming scholarly empha-
sis on curtailing government excesses has meant that virtually no sus-
 27 See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a Posi-
tive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984) (detailing the manner in which the government 
uses its power to allocate resources to influence constitutionally protected choices and 
proposing a framework for assessing the constitutionality of “allocational sanctions”); Ro-
bert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996) [hereinafter Post, Subsidized Speech] 
(discussing the constitutional questions raised when the government subsidizes speech); 
Redish & Kessler, supra note 25 (proposing an analytical structure for assessing the consti-
tutionality of government subsidies of speech); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 
UCLA L. REV. 565, 622–53 (1980) (assessing government subsidies of speech under an 
“eclectic” analytic framework). 
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tained attention has been given to the ways in which government 
speech might have a positive influence on expression while still re-
specting the values of free speech.  We accept that, on the one hand, 
the government may not sanction individuals for expressing disfa-
vored viewpoints, and also that, on the other hand, the government 
can and will function as a participant in the marketplace of ideas.  
Our understanding of government speech is thus organized around 
the two poles of coercion and participation.  But does there exist, be-
tween these poles, a zone of permissible influence, where the gov-
ernment speaks in order to deter expression but does so while respect-
ing individuals’ freedom to resist that discouragement? 
Any independent participant in public debate seeks to deter, in a 
sense, the expression of those with whom she disagrees.  The differ-
ence, in the case of the government, is that its monopoly on a variety 
of forms of power and channels of communication means that its 
participation consistently risks becoming coercion.  Rather than po-
licing the line between the two, this Article sets out to explore it, with 
the goal of discovering which forms of persuasion might be especially 
effective against hate speech.  This Article will explore those charac-
teristics of government speech that make it so uniquely influential as 
an arbiter of social meanings and ask how this power can be used to 
reduce the use of hateful language by citizens.  How might the gov-
ernment set out to quell speech but yet stop short of violating free 
speech values? 
Part I will survey the positions taken by the free speech and anti-
subordination camps and sketch the reasons why their debate has 
ended in an impasse.  It will include a brief history of the rise and fall 
of efforts to regulate hate speech and conclude with a discussion of 
the Supreme Court’s cases addressing hate speech regulation, argu-
ing that the form the doctrine currently takes, though it favors free 
speech, also reflects the tension between the two positions.  Part II 
lays out a typology of forms of government speech that are constitu-
tionally permissible that might be used to deter or undermine the 
force of hate speech.  The typology is not intended to be exhaustive; 
rather, it seeks to present an array of interventions that range from 
the merely precatory to the arguably coercive.  After Part II proposes 
alternatives, Part III evaluates them, anticipating the arguments that 
will be made by both free speech advocates and anti-subordination 
advocates against each possible form of government intervention.  
The goal of this section is to discover which anti-hate speech tactics 
might be acceptable to both camps.  Is there a range of forms of gov-
ernment speech that are adequately effective while also being ade-
quately respectful of free speech values?  Which forms should be 
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ruled out as undesirable, and why?  Part IV briefly draws out some 
conclusions based upon this exploration. 
I.  THE IMPASSE 
In 1993, Catharine MacKinnon observed that “[t]he law of equal-
ity and the law of freedom of speech are on a collision course in this 
country.”28  Her assessment was prompted by the struggle over hate 
speech regulation, which was, at the time, at a fever pitch.  From the 
late 1980s through the early 1990s, there was an outpouring of com-
mentary calling for legal restrictions on the use of language that con-
veys a message of hate and exclusion to marginalized groups.  Codes 
were proposed, and in some cases passed, banning the use of slurs, 
epithets, symbols that convey threatening meanings, and the like.29  
The predominant focus of much of this literature was on racist lan-
guage, but analysis of the problem of hateful language need not be, 
and indeed was not, confined to race.  At the same time that scholars 
such as Richard Delgado and Mari Matsuda called forcefully for the 
regulation of racist speech,30 MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin called 
for a ban on pornography, or images that depict and so perpetuate 
the subordination of women.31  Other writers have been concerned 
with hate speech directed against groups defined by religion or sex-
ual orientation.32  The common theme among these various argu-
ments33 was that punitive legal sanctions can and should be imposed 
 28 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (1993). 
 29 See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 30 Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:  A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name 
Calling, in MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:  CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89 (1993) (arguing for a tort action for 
racial insults); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:  Considering the Victim’s Story, 
in MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., supra at 17 (1993) (proposing criminal and administrative 
sanctions for racist speech). 
 31 See Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin, Minneapolis:  Memo on Proposed Ordinance 
on Pornography, in IN HARM’S WAY:  THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS 253 (Ca-
tharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997). 
 32 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Since When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equal-
ity?  Some Reflections on the Construction of the “Hate-Speech” Debate from a Lesbian/Gay Perspec-
tive, in HENRY LOUIS GATES ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, 
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 294 (1994) (arguing that when the homosexual com-
munity has achieved legal equality it has been through the First Amendment, not 
through the Fourteenth). 
 33 There are important differences among these different groups’ experiences of marginali-
zation and subordination that should not be obscured.  See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 30, 
at 22–23 (“Although I believe [hate speech against women, gays and lesbians requires] 
public restriction, these forms also require a separate analysis because of the complex and 
violent nature of gender subordination and the different way in which sex operates as a 
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when speakers use hateful language or images to malign and threaten 
members of marginalized groups.  Without such sanctions, the Four-
teenth Amendment’s promise of equality could never be fulfilled, for 
speech is a pervasive and powerful means of perpetuating inequal-
ity.34
As MacKinnon observed, a collision of sorts was taking place, in 
the sense that these proposals met with forceful opposition.  Such 
groups as the ACLU and a significant number of legal scholars coun-
tered that anti-hate speech regulations amount to censorship of un-
popular speech.35  At a deeper level, however, MacKinnon’s prophecy 
that First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment law would vio-
lently, meaningfully clash went unfulfilled.  She argued that two of 
our strongest constitutional norms coexisted in a state of conflict that 
had long gone unrecognized.36  Her prediction and hope was that 
this tension would erupt into an outright conflict that would force 
upon us the necessity of recognizing that the doctrines are incom-
patible in their current form:  we cannot have equality without some 
locus of oppression.  The deadly violence that accompanies the persistent verbal degrada-
tion of those subordinated because of gender or sexuality explodes the notion that there 
are clear lines between words and deeds.”); Serena Mayeri, “A Common Fate of Discrimina-
tion”:  Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001) 
(tracing the evolution of arguments analogizing race and gender from the 1960s to the 
present).  The regulation of racist speech may also raise different issues from the regula-
tion of sexist or homophobic speech because of the particular status of race discrimina-
tion under the Constitution.  Akhil Amar, for example, has argued that the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on slavery and involuntary servitude may lend extra force to the argu-
ment that racist speech can be banned.  Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Miss-
ing Amendments:  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 155–60 (1992).  Amar 
notes that while the Thirteenth Amendment bans all slavery, not just the enslavement of 
African Americans, it has long been understood to especially target race-based slavery.  Id. 
at 156.  Without wishing to elide the differences among racism, sexism, homophobia, re-
ligious discrimination, and other forms of discrimination, this Article will treat hate 
speech as a problem afflicting numerous marginalized groups that have certain common 
features that can be usefully analyzed. 
 34 See MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 72 (arguing that “[b]oth [First Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment law] show virtually total insensitivity to the damage done to social 
equality by expressive means and a substantial lack of recognition that some people get a 
lot more speech than others”). 
 35 See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 36 MacKinnon explains that the conflict had gone unnoticed because historical develop-
ments had led us to see each as a largely negative imperative.  She observes that positive 
interventions in favor of equality have not been undertaken in the name of the Four-
teenth Amendment but under the Commerce Clause or the state police power, so the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked only negatively.  MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 
73–74.  Meanwhile, First Amendment doctrine in its contemporary form emerged in re-
sponse to government efforts to censor political subversion; the entire area of doctrine is 
thus focused on preventing self-interested government overreaching.  Id. at 74–76. 
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regulation of speech.37  Instead of a thoroughgoing reconsideration 
of the content and shape of the constitutional norms of equality and 
free speech, however, we reached an impasse.  Arguments in favor of 
hate speech regulation were brought up short by the strong First 
Amendment prohibition on content discrimination.  That is where 
we still find ourselves, more than fifteen years on. 
A.  Anti-Subordination Arguments for the Regulation of Speech 
Members of the anti-subordination camp have made their view 
clear:  the First Amendment, as currently understood, is an active im-
pediment to achieving equality in the United States.  Hate speech 
causes harms that are a direct affront to equality norms.  When it tar-
gets an individual, that person is made to feel inferior and vulnerable 
on the basis of her membership in a group.38  When it targets the 
group as a whole, it perpetuates the opinion that group members are 
inferior and appropriately subordinated.39  Moreover, hate speech is 
detrimental to the effective functioning of the “marketplace of ideas” 
that the First Amendment is designed to protect.  Hate speech effec-
tively silences would-be participants from subordinated groups.  Not 
only does this mean that inequality will be still further perpetuated 
because members of marginalized groups will be prevented from ef-
fectively making political claims, it also means that in the area of hate 
speech, the First Amendment works to subvert itself.  The First 
Amendment prohibition on laws regulating hate speech undermines 
the Amendment’s core value of free and equal democratic debate be-
 37 MacKinnon forecast that this state of affairs would lead “[t]o a new model for freedom of 
expression in which the free speech position no longer supports social dominance, as it 
does now . . . . The state will have as great a role in providing relief from injury to equality 
through speech and in giving equal access to speech as it now has in disciplining its 
power to intervene in that speech that manages to get expressed.”  Id. at 109. 
 38 Writers have chronicled the immediate and long-term emotional and psychological dis-
tress that victims of hate speech experience.  See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 30, at 93–96. 
 39 Scholars have also focused on the damage suffered by the target group as a whole when a 
pattern of hateful speech against them exists in society.  Mari Matsuda, for example, ob-
serves that racist speech is part of an interrelated set of practices that “[keep] selected vic-
tim groups in subordinated positions.”  Matsuda, supra note 30, at 23.  One way of think-
ing about the group harm has been to focus on group libel.  See Kenneth Lasson, Group 
Libel Versus Free Speech:  When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 77 (1984); Ken-
neth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech:  Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 11 (1985); David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation:  Control of Group Libel, 42 
COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1942). 
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cause it prevents the rectification of the subordination that silences 
key participants.40
Those in the anti-subordination camp share certain theoretical 
commitments that undergird their definition of hate speech and 
their understanding of how it works its harms.  First, they observe that 
hate speech, as distinct from ordinary acts of disparagement and ag-
gression, invokes enmity against a recognizable, subordinated 
group.41  This quality is indeed essential to its character as a manifes-
tation of discrimination.  A number of scholars have argued that it is 
not possible to use hate speech against a person who is not a member 
of a historically subordinated group.42  Hate speech achieves its ef-
fects by reminding the target of her vulnerability by virtue of her sta-
tus as a group member.43
Theories of hate speech also assume that specific words, symbols, 
and propositions acquire, over time, uniquely potent status as signifi-
ers of exclusion, persecution, and degradation.44  Paradigmatic ex-
amples of such potent language include burning crosses and words 
such as “nigger,” “kike,” and “fag.”  This assumption is not always 
made explicit in discussions of hate speech, and, indeed, some schol-
arly definitions of hate speech have a broader reach.  Mari Matsuda, 
 40 The foregoing paragraph draws on Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First 
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 272–77 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech] 
(summarizing the existing literature).  Post also discusses the “deontic” harm that can be 
said to be caused by racist speech because of its intrinsic incompatibility with the value of 
equality and the specific harm it causes to educational communities.  Id. at 272, 275–77; 
see also Amy Adler, What’s Left?:  Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expres-
sion, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1512 (1996) (cataloguing the theories of harm advanced by 
proponents of hate speech regulation). 
 41 See Delgado, supra note 30, at 94 (“Racial insults, relying as they do on the unalterable fact 
of the victim’s race and on the history of slavery and race discrimination in this country, 
have an even greater potential for harm than other insults.”). 
 42 Matsuda excludes racist speech against whites (for example, Malcolm X’s attacks on 
“white devil[s]”) from her category of proscribable speech because whites have not his-
torically suffered from slavery or discrimination.  Matsuda, supra note 30, at 38–39. 
 43 See Delgado, supra note 30, at 94 (“Verbal tags provide a convenient means of categoriza-
tion so that individuals may be treated as members of a class and assumed to share all the 
negative attitudes imputed to the class. . . . Racial insults also serve to keep the victim 
compliant.”); Matsuda, supra note 30, at 24–25 (“One subconscious response [to hate 
speech] is to reject one’s own identity as a victim-group member. . . . Target-group mem-
bers must either identify with a community that promotes racist speech or admit that the 
community does not include them.”). 
 44 See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:  Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in 
MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at 53, 74 (“Black folks know that no racial incident 
is ‘isolated’ in the United States.  That is what makes the incidents so horrible, so scary.  It 
is the knowledge that they are not the isolated unpopular speech of a dissident few that 
makes them so frightening.  These incidents are manifestations of an ubiquitous and 
deeply ingrained cultural belief system, an American way of life.”). 
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for example, identifies racist speech by three characteristics:  “1. The 
message is of racial inferiority[;] 2. The message is directed against a 
historically oppressed group[;] 3. The message is persecutory, hate-
ful, and degrading.”45  Matsuda’s definition potentially encompasses 
any statement expressing the idea that an historically oppressed race 
is inferior to others when that message is degrading (as messages of 
inferiority are likely to be).  But most examples given by scholars ad-
vocating hate speech regulation center around totemic words and 
symbols that are particularly freighted, by history, with hateful mean-
ing.46  When scholars do argue for banning “rational” or “cold” (as 
Matsuda puts it) hate speech, the speech that they propose banning 
tends to have acquired its particular power to harm because of its his-
torical association with discrimination.47  Matsuda, for example, states 
that she advocates criminalizing pseudo-rational statements about 
Jews such as “monetary conspiracy theories [and] tales of mysterious 
cartels,” assertions which have, historically, been used to incite racial 
hatred and to justify both non-violent and violent forms of persecu-
tion.48  Without that historical connection, “cold” or even “hot” 
speech that makes derogatory assertions about a particular group 
lacks any special power to instill fear or a sense of subordination and 
remains merely insulting.49  Words may acquire this power by being 
used not only in connection with acts and threats of violence but also 
in connection with the routine, dismissive gestures, and deeds that 
accompany thoroughgoing social subordination.50
 45 Matsuda, supra note 30, at 36. 
 46 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 30, at 94 (“No other use remains for such words as ‘nigger,’ 
‘wop,’ ‘spick,’ or ‘kike.’”); Lawrence, supra note 44, at 67–68 (“The experience of being 
called ‘nigger,’ ‘spic,’ ‘Jap,’ or ‘kike’ is like receiving a slap in the face.”). 
 47 See Matsuda, supra note 30, at 42 (“I am inclined to criminalize the cold-blooded version 
of anti-Semitic literature.  Given the historical record, this ‘cold’ version is just as hateful, 
for all its tone of distorted rationality, as the ‘hot’ name-calling versions.  To call the Ho-
locaust a myth is to defame the dead, as Elie Wiesel has so eloquently put it.”). 
 48 Id. at 41.  Matsuda observes that “these texts take their hateful meaning from their his-
torical context and connection to violence.”  Id. at 42. 
 49 This assumption explains the distinction Matsuda makes between rationally argued anti-
Semitism and the speech of “the dead-wrong social scientist” who sincerely argues from 
flawed empirical evidence for racial inferiority; Matsuda excludes the latter’s statements 
from her category of proscribable speech.  See id. at 40–42.  To the extent that advocates 
of hate speech regulation would ban all statements that imply the inferiority of a given 
group, this Article does not share their definition or its premises.  Some such limitation 
seems necessary if hate speech is to be addressed as a discrete problem apart from gener-
alized discrimination. 
50  As theorist Judith Butler explains, “[t]he racial slur is always cited from elsewhere, and in 
the speaking of it, one chimes in with a chorus of racists, producing at that moment the 
linguistic occasion for an imagined relation to an historically transmitted community of 
racists.”  JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH 80 (1997) [hereinafter BUTLER, EXCITABLE 
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Hate speech also draws on the present reality of subordination to 
accomplish its harms.  Charles Lawrence, for example, distinguishes 
between racist speech and ordinary speech because pervasive dis-
crimination renders the target of racist speech relatively powerless to 
respond.  “The racist name caller is accompanied by a cultural chorus 
of equally demeaning speech and symbols,” he writes.  “Each individ-
ual message gains its power because of the cumulative and reinforc-
ing effect of countless similar messages that are conveyed in a society 
where racism is ubiquitous.”51  The speaker employing hateful speech 
purports to speak not only for herself but for the collective, as though 
voicing the contempt felt by all for members of the target’s group. 
If language draws on existing inequalities for its power to wound, 
it also reinforces inequalities in a number of ways.  At the moment of 
communication, advocates of hate speech regulation point out, the 
victim of hate speech is made to feel inferior, self-doubting, threat-
ened.52  Moreover, hate speech naturalizes discrimination.  The cas-
ual use of racist, sexist or homophobic epithets and the ubiquity of 
words and images that figure the inferiority of marginalized groups 
present the subordinate status of those groups as an inevitable fact 
about the world, something preexisting for which there is already a 
name.53
Performance theorists have stressed the constitutive role language 
plays in establishing social identities and relations. Theorists such as 
Judith Butler portray a world that is not made up of autonomous in-
dividuals who choose what to become, but rather in which preexist-
SPEECH].  She further explains:  “[I]njurious names have a history, one that is invoked 
and reconsolidated at the moment of utterance, but not explicitly told. . . . The name has, 
thus, a historicity, what might be understood as the history which has become internal to a 
name . . . : the sedimentation of its usages.”  Id. at 36; see also MACKINNON, supra note 28, 
at 59–60 (“[T]he social reality of language in use determines what it conveys and means 
and does, such that to say these words do not have this meaning or do these things is to 
say that this social reality does not exist.”).  Mari Matsuda puts this point in the terms of 
individual experience:  “The Japanese-American executive who resigns in protest when 
his employer starts publishing anti-Japanese slogans to improve sales knows that there is a 
connection between racist words and racist deeds.”  Matsuda, supra note 30, at 24. 
 51 Lawrence, supra note 44, at 68–69. 
 52 See Delgado, supra note 30, at 94–95 (“Verbal tags thus make it easier for their users to 
justify their own superior position with respect to others.  Racial insults also serve to keep 
the victim compliant. . . . Social scientists who have studied the effects of racism have 
found that speech that communicates low regard for an individual because of race ‘tends 
to create in the victim those very traits of “inferiority” that it ascribes to him.’ . . .  Because 
they constantly hear racist messages, minority children, not surprisingly, come to ques-
tion their competence, intelligence, and worth.”). 
 53 See MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 31 (“Words and images are how people are placed in 
hierarchies, how social stratification is made to seem inevitable and right . . . .”). 
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ing cultural forms, including linguistic norms, determine the shape 
that identities take.54  The speaker using hateful speech reiterates the 
fact of hierarchy, of a social structure in which some groups are supe-
rior and others inferior—indeed, this social structure exists by virtue 
of speakers’ continual use of language that makes it present.  Hate 
speech is said to “perform” subordination in the sense that it calls it 
into being.55  Butler explains, “[H]ate speech . . . does not describe 
an injury or produce one as a consequence; it is, in the very speaking 
of such speech, the performance of the injury itself, where the injury 
is understood as social subordination.”56  Or, as Matsuda writes:  “Rac-
ist speech is particularly harmful because it is a mechanism of subor-
dination, reinforcing a historical vertical relationship.”57
If one accepts some or all of the foregoing propositions about the 
relationship between language and subordination, regulating hate 
speech follows logically from a serious commitment to equality.58  
Without the regulation of hate speech, the system of laws intended to 
combat discrimination only incompletely addresses the problem.59  
Scholars in the anti-subordination camp have assailed what they see 
as First Amendment orthodoxies that, in the name of neutrality, pro-
vide cover for the perpetuation of discrimination.  Like MacKinnon, 
 54 Butler explains, “Sociological discussions have conventionally sought to understand the 
notion of the person in terms of an agency that claims ontological priority to the various 
roles and functions through which it assumes social visibility and meaning.”  But “[t]o 
what extent,” she asks, “do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute 
identity, the internal coherence of the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the per-
son?”  JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 22–
23 (1990). 
 55 See MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 13 (“Social inequality is substantially created and en-
forced—that is, done—through words and images.  Social hierarchy cannot and does not 
exist without being embodied in meanings and expressed in communications.”); Charles 
R. Lawrence III et al., Introduction, in MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, 1, 9 (“[R]acism 
achieves its purpose by the construction of meaning. . . .  We are acted upon and con-
structed by racist speech.”). 
 56 BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 50, at 18. 
 57 Matsuda, supra note 30, at 36.  While Butler gives a powerful explication of Matsuda’s 
theory, she ultimately resists the conclusion that a prohibition on hate speech is either 
necessary or desirable. 
 58 Charles Lawrence, for example, sees Brown v. Board of Education as a case about speech:  
“Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily because of the mes-
sage segregation conveys . . . .”  Lawrence, supra note 44, at 59. Its holding that separate 
but equal is unconstitutional entails the conclusion that messages of racial inequality 
generally are prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 59–62. 
 59 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 30, at 90 (“The racial insult remains one of the most perva-
sive channels through which discriminatory attitudes are imparted.”); Lawrence et al., su-
pra note 55, at 7 (describing hate speech as “part of an integrated arsenal of weapons of 
oppression and subordination”); Matsuda, supra note 30, at 23 (detailing “the imple-
ments of racism,” of which racist speech is one). 
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the authors of Words That Wound argue that “the [F]irst 
[A]mendment arms conscious and unconscious racists . . . with a con-
stitutional right to be racist.”60
Proponents of hate speech regulation argue that the Thirteenth61 
and Fourteenth62 Amendments require qualification of the general 
First Amendment proscription on content- and viewpoint-
discrimination by the government.63  The Constitution, on this view, 
is not neutral when it comes to discrimination.64
Moreover, members of the anti-subordination camp claim, hate 
speech undermines crucial free speech values.  They observe that 
hate speech itself does not promote the exchange of ideas because it 
does not convey its message through rational argument, nor can it be 
refuted through rational argument.65  By its very nature, therefore, 
hate speech does not deserve First Amendment protection.  More-
over, hate speech either silences members of marginalized groups or 
devalues their opinions when expressed.66  The free and equal ex-
change of ideas that, according to First Amendment orthodoxy, will 
 60 Lawrence et al., supra note 55, at 15. 
 61 Amar, supra note 33, at 155–60 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
on “badges of servitude” might profitably be invoked to defend anti-hate speech ordi-
nances); Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389 (2004) 
(proposing that a federal ban on hate speech could be grounded in the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 62 MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 71–74 (describing the “tensions and intersections” between 
First Amendment speech and Fourteenth Amendment equality); Lawrence, supra note 
44, at 86 (noting that there are “competing constitutional values expressed in the [F]irst 
and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments”). 
 63 See Lawrence et al., supra note 55, at 15 (“Racism is just another idea deserving of consti-
tutional protection like all ideas.  The [F]irst [A]mendment is employed to trump or nul-
lify the only substantive meaning of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause, that the Constitu-
tion mandates the disestablishment of the ideology of racism.”). 
 64 As Amar points out, this argument may, at least as an initial matter, make a stronger case 
for regulating racist speech against African Americans than for regulating hateful speech 
against other groups.  Amar, supra note 33 at 156–57. 
 65 As Charles R. Lawrence III observes, a racist epithet conveys immediate injury and so is 
more like the disvalued category of “fighting words” that does not receive First Amend-
ment protection than it is like the rational public discourse that the First Amendment 
most values.  Lawrence, supra note 44, at 67–68.  And hate speech is “preemptive”:  “words 
of response to such verbal attacks may never be forthcoming because speech is usually an 
inadequate response.”  Id. at 68. 
 66 Id. at 83–85 (arguing that the civil libertarian viewpoint fails to take into account the ex-
tent to which hate speech marginalizes certain speakers in public debate); see also Post, 
Racist Speech, supra note 40, at 275 (noting the argument that “racist expression harms the 
very marketplace of ideas that the [F]irst [A]mendment is designed to foster”). 
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eventually uncover the truth,67 is forever handicapped by the absence 
of these voices.68
On a doctrinal level, these claims take the form of the argument 
that hate speech is not protected speech at all.  Rather, it is a category 
of utterance akin to “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words,” categories that the Supreme 
Court, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, deemed to be “no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”69  Such 
speech can be regulated without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment.70  In a related claim, advocates of regulation further argue that 
hate speech is not “speech” at all but in fact a kind of action.71  It may 
 67 The virtue of the “marketplace of ideas” has long been an article of faith in First Amend-
ment theory.  The metaphor was first advanced by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams 
v. United States.  “Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logi-
cal,” he noted.  “If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain 
result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all op-
position. . . .  But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out.”  250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 68 See MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 78 (“Speech theory does not disclose or even consider 
how to deal with power vanquishing powerlessness; it tends to transmute this into truth 
vanquishing falsehood, meaning what power wins becomes considered true.”). 
 69 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  Mari Matsuda proposes that hate speech be established as its 
own low-value category of speech.  Matsuda, supra note 30, at 35 (“I believe racist speech 
is best treated as a sui generis category, presenting an idea so historically untenable, so 
dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very classes of 
human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside the 
realm of protected discourse.”).  Lawrence argues that racist speech is “the functional 
equivalent of fighting words.”  Lawrence, supra note 44, at 66–71.  Delgado argues that 
hate speech is low-value speech because it makes no contribution to the ascertainment of 
truth.  Delgado, supra note 30, at 107–09. 
 70 As the Supreme Court stated, “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.  But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992); infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text. 
 71 MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 23 (“Pornography is not restricted [under her proposed 
anti-pornography ordinance] because of what it says.  It is restricted through what it 
does.”).  On the limitations that must necessarily be imposed on the meaning of “speech” 
for First Amendment purposes, see Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment:  
A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981), and Frederick Schauer, Speech and 
“Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”:  An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Lan-
guage, 67 GEO. L. J. 899 (1979). 
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therefore be prohibited just as perjury, blackmail, and conspiracy 
are.72
B.  Free Speech Arguments Against the Regulation of Hate Speech 
Opposition to proposals to regulate hate speech has been force-
ful.  Critics of these proposals have written from a variety of perspec-
tives:  some reject the theoretical premises of proponents of regula-
tion, while others accept them but conclude that effective regulation 
is infeasible or undesirable. 
The strong civil libertarian case against regulation founds its ar-
guments squarely in First Amendment doctrine.  The civil libertarian 
view, as, for example, Nadine Strossen explains, takes it as fundamen-
tal that free speech is “indivisible”—that is, regulators will not be able 
to draw lines cordoning off speech that expresses a particular view-
point, however discredited and invidious, without opening the way 
for the suppression of any speech that legislators happen to disfavor.  
This is the basis of the content-neutrality principle.73  To maintain 
this strict protection of all ideas while also allowing the government 
to go about the basic task of protecting itself and its citizens from 
harm, First Amendment doctrine appropriately distinguishes between 
speech and conduct and between advocacy and incitement.74  Free 
speech must be allowed up to the point that it causes injurious con-
duct to take place.  The civil libertarian position denies that hate 
speech is properly understood to be conduct.  “Although undoubt-
edly harmful,” Strossen writes, “the utterance of disparaging remarks 
cannot be equated fairly with the systematic denial of all rights to a 
group of human beings.”75  Speech that tends to cause violence or 
other violations of the law is appropriately punishable only at the 
point when it becomes express incitement; mere advocacy is pro-
tected.76
Moreover, even assuming that it would be desirable to suppress 
hate speech, civil libertarians worry that any regulations drafted with 
 72 For the most sustained discussion of the distinction between speech and action and the 
reasons why the First Amendment countenances the punishment of crimes committed 
verbally, such as blackmail, see KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF 
LANGUAGE (1989). 
 73 Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus:  A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
484, 533–34. 
 74 Id. at 531–41. 
 75 Id. at 533. 
 76 Id. at 532–33; see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating a statute 
that punishes “mere advocacy”). 
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this goal in mind would chill speech that the First Amendment 
should protect, either because the regulations would be vague, or be-
cause they could be enforced discriminatorily.77 The proper ap-
proach, under this view, is to protect all speech and expect that in the 
long run, hateful ideas will die a natural death in the “marketplace of 
ideas.”78  As Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote in his opinion striking 
down Indianapolis’s anti-pornography law (which adopted language 
proposed by Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin), “[u]nder the First 
Amendment the government must leave to the people the evaluation 
of ideas.  Bald or subtle, an idea is as powerful as the audience allows 
it to be.”79  The civil libertarian view thus combines a strong emphasis 
on prophylaxis—we must avoid all content- and viewpoint-based regu-
lation, because once we allow any we will chill speech and fall down 
the “slippery slope” to free-ranging government censorship—with a 
firm belief in the virtues of free and vigorous public debate. 
Other First Amendment theorists, in accord with the civil libertar-
ian view, have elaborated the positive values promoted by protecting 
even hateful speech.  In The Tolerant Society, Lee Bollinger argues that 
through the difficult process of accepting such extreme demonstra-
tions as a parade of American Nazis,80 society learns the key democ-
ratic virtue of tolerance.81  Vincent Blasi makes the related argument 
that participating in the unfettered exchange of ideas promotes posi-
tive character traits such as “inquisitiveness, independence of judg-
ment, distrust of authority, willingness to take initiative, perseverance, 
and the courage to confront evil.”82  In particular, he warns against 
the complacency that regulating hate speech may engender.  
“[C]onfronting falsehood and evil profoundly shapes the character of 
a person or a society,” he writes, and “such an experience is short-
circuited by censorship.”83  He continues, 
 77 Strossen, supra note 73, at 527–28; see also Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989) (holding that the University of Michigan’s anti-hate speech policy violated 
the First Amendment because it was overbroad and impermissibly vague). 
 78 See supra note 67 (considering the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor in the history of the 
First Amendment). 
 79 Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327–28 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 80 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 12–42 (1986) (relating the history of the 
Skokie controversy); see also infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 81 Bollinger asserts that “a willingness to compromise and a willingness even to accept total 
defeat are essential components of the democratic personality.”  Id. at 117.  He explains 
that the right result was reached in the Skokie controversy because it is through tolerating 
even—or especially—intolerant speech (such as that of the Nazi demonstrators) that we 
best learn this virtue.  Id. at 124–33. 
 82 Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1999). 
 83 Id. at 1573–74. 
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[T]he disturbing tendency, illustrated by our recent efforts to control ra-
cism on college campuses, is to think the day’s work is done when the 
self-congratulatory code is enacted.  The passage of laws too often has the 
quality of a moral shortcut, and too often diverts what could be honest, if 
stressful, exchanges that might actually impact beliefs into shallow foren-
sic contests over legal coverage.84
Both Bollinger and Blasi stress the values taught through the process 
of confrontation; regulation of hate speech might conduce to the at-
rophying of our civic capacities.85
A final sub-group of free speech advocates make arguments that 
are particularly worth noting because they share many of the prem-
ises of those who advocate for hate speech regulation.  The civil liber-
tarians, as well as to a great extent Bollinger and Blasi, treat hateful 
speech as speech that puts forth a proposition, albeit despicable, that 
can eventually be defeated by counter-propositions.  But other schol-
ars, more fully committed to the proposition that hateful speech can 
be an essential way in which discrimination is made real and main-
tained, have nevertheless resisted proposals for regulation. 
Some worry about the implications of the claim to authority that is 
entailed in deciding what speech does and does not deserve to be 
heard.  Robert Post, for example, notes that state regulation of the 
formation of racial identity risks imposing a monolithic vision of that 
identity on a group of people who are diverse and likely do not share 
perfect consensus about their defining characteristics.86  The possi-
bilities of distortion and power-grabbing are simply too abundant 
here. 
Other scholars have questioned the wisdom of regulation out of 
concern for its effect on language use generally.  Judith Butler and 
Amy Adler, for example, both accept the theory that words and sym-
bols are constitutive of social reality and so can be powerful aids to 
and means of discrimination.87  Nevertheless, both Butler and Adler 
 84 Id. at 1574. 
 85 Cf. generally JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS:  FREE SPEECH AND THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION (2005) (tracing liberal free speech advocates’ recurring preoccupation, be-
ginning with Saint Paul, with society’s confrontation of—and mastery over—noxious and 
evil ideas). 
 86 See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 40, at 293–98, 306–09. 
 87 Indeed, for Butler, the very existence of the individual depends on being recognizable to 
others, who only recognize those people and things for which they already have names.  
See BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 50, at 5 (“[T]o be addressed is not merely to 
be recognized for what one already is, but to have the very term conferred by which the 
recognition of existence becomes possible.  One comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this funda-
mental dependency on the address of the Other.  One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being 
recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable.”).  Butler has questioned, for ex-
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resist regulation of hateful speech.  Instead, both stress the possibility 
of subversive use of the same words, epithets and symbols that else-
where tend to reinforce existing structures of subordination.88  Adler 
points out that while proponents of regulation tend to assume that 
the words and symbols of hate speech have only one possible mean-
ing, in fact the subversive use of such words as “nigger” and “queer” 
has become a powerful tactic of marginalized groups.89  Butler shares 
this concern, observing that the meaning of names and words gener-
ally is never fixed, and a hateful epithet or pornographic image can 
be reinterpreted or reused in a way that resists, rather than perpetu-
ates, subordination.90  Regulation would forestall the possibility of 
such subversive uses of hateful speech and so would shut down the 
process of provocation, critical thought, and linguistic change that 
they initiate.  This process may be, in the long term, a more effective 
way to counter hate speech because it undermines its hateful mean-
ing rather than taking it as an incontrovertible fact. 
The potential costs of regulating hate speech thus include the 
possibility of creeping government censorship, but also extend well 
beyond it.  By adopting a prohibition on hateful language, we would 
risk undermining not only our freedom of expression but also key ci-
tizenship values and the generative mutability of language itself. 
C.  The Doctrinal Response 
After the two camps in the debate had staked out their positions, 
legal doctrine came down on the side of free speech, with the Su-
preme Court striking down an anti-hate speech law in the 1992 deci-
sion R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.  The issue was taken as resolved, but in 
ample, whether there is such a thing as sex outside of the discursive formations that give 
us such categories as “male” and “female.”  See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 54. 
 88 Butler writes, 
I wish to question for the moment the presumption that hate speech always works, 
not to minimize the pain that is suffered as a consequence of hate speech, but to 
leave open the possibility that its failure is the condition of a critical response.  If 
the account of the injury of hate speech forecloses the possibility of a critical re-
sponse to that injury, the account confirms the totalizing effects of such an injury.  
Such arguments are often useful in legal contexts, but are counter-productive for 
the thinking of nonstate-centered forms of agency and resistance. 
  BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 50, at 19. 
 89 She observes that leftist artists, in particular, have brought these words back with a venge-
ance in works that “make the viewer uncomfortable, [that] force her to question the 
meaning of the work and to confront other speech she may encounter with greater suspi-
cion.”  Adler, supra note 40, at 1544. 
 90 “[I]f the text acts once, it can act again,” Butler writes, “and possibly against its prior act.  
This raises the possibility of resignification . . . .”  BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 
50, at 69. 
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2003, the Court found that an anti-cross burning statute—one that 
the Virginia Supreme Court had itself struck down under R.A.V.—did 
not run afoul of the First Amendment’s general prohibition on con-
tent- and viewpoint-discrimination.  In its current form, legal doctrine 
reflects the tension between the values of anti-subordination and free 
speech. 
The problem of how to address the harms caused by hate speech 
has occupied courts’ and commentators’ attention at least since the 
1930s and 40s, when observation of the tactics used to vilify racial and 
national groups in Nazi Germany prompted a desire to control such 
speech in America.91  In the 1952 case Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Su-
preme Court upheld a group libel statute that banned speech that 
“portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class 
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion.”92  The holding of 
Beauharnais, however, was significantly undermined by subsequent 
decisions.  The 1964 decision New York Times v. Sullivan drastically al-
tered the status of all libel claims in light of First Amendment val-
ues.93  And in 1978, efforts to prevent demonstrators from marching 
through the village of Skokie, Illinois wearing Nazi uniforms, display-
ing swastikas, and bearing signs printed with white supremacist slo-
gans were defeated, an episode that suggested that the principles of 
Beauharnais were now seriously in doubt.94
The early 1980s, however, witnessed a revival of efforts to develop 
legal strategies to prohibit and punish hate speech, and throughout 
 91 See David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation:  Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 
727, 728 (1942) (discussing the role of defamation in rise to power by the Nazis in Ger-
many). 
 92 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 471 (1949)). 
 93 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  Beauharnais had upheld that aspect of Illinois’ group libel law that 
provided that the defense of truth was not adequate to defeat a claim; the defendant also 
had to show that “the publication be made ‘with good motives and for justifiable ends.’”  
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 265.  New York Times v. Sullivan held that not only does the First 
Amendment require that a defense of truth be sufficient to defeat a claim of libel, the 
plaintiff must also prove that the defendant made the false statements “with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  New York Times, 
376 U.S. at 280. 
 94 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 916 (1978).  The Sev-
enth Circuit distinguished Beauharnais on the ground that the statute at issue there aimed 
to prohibit speech that would provoke a breach of the peace and so could be classed as 
“‘fighting’ words,” which the First Amendment does not protect.  Beauharnais, 578 F.2d at 
1204.  It also expressed considerable doubt that the “fighting words” category of unpro-
tected speech, established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), still sur-
vived as a valid exception to First Amendment protection.  Beauharnais, 578 F.2d at 1204 
(“It may be questioned, after cases such as Cohen v. California, . . . Gooding v. Wil-
son, . . . and Brandenburg v. Ohio, . . . whether the tendency to induce violence approach sanc-
tioned implicitly in Beauharnais would pass constitutional muster today.”). 
1138 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
the decade scholarly and public concern with hate speech intensified.  
The strategies advanced include establishing a tort action for racial 
insults,95 adopting municipal and state regulations banning expres-
sion intended to incite racial hatred,96 and adopting similar rules on 
college campuses.97  The most successful of these was the effort to re-
gulate speech on college campuses, with well over one hundred 
schools adopting some kind of anti-hate speech rule.98  This trend 
provoked intense controversy, however, and a number of campus 
speech codes were found by lower courts to violate the First Amend-
ment as overbroad.99  Meanwhile, any momentum to regulate hate 
speech on the level of municipal or state law was halted when the Su-
preme Court, in the 1992 case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, struck down a 
city ordinance that banned the display of “a burning cross[,] or Nazi 
swastika, [or other symbol that] one knows or has reasonable grounds 
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”100
Justice Scalia, joined by four other justices, held that the statute 
represented impermissible viewpoint discrimination.  The Court re-
jected the anti-subordination camp’s argument that hate speech 
could be banned as a sub-category of “fighting words.”  It accepted 
the proposition that “fighting words” are proscribable because of 
their “nonspeech” aspects (their tendency to provoke violence)101 and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s finding that the statute in question 
 95 See Delgado, supra note 30; see also Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990) (discussing the his-
tory of tort actions for discriminatory and persecutory speech and the implications of the 
Model Communicative Tort Act for future, similar actions); Dean M. Richardson, Racism:  
A Tort of Outrage, 61 OR. L. REV. 267 (1982) (arguing that the tort of outrage, also known 
as intentional infliction of emotional distress, “has great potential as a means of recovery 
for persons injured by racist conduct and as a method for changing racist beliefs and atti-
tudes”). 
 96 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 97 See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:  Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 343 (1991) (discussing the constitutional problems presented by university 
speech codes prohibiting slurs and disparaging remarks directed against persons on ac-
count of their ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation); Lawrence, supra note 44 (discuss-
ing university speech codes); Strossen, supra note 73 (describing the rise of university 
speech codes and arguing against them). 
 98 See David Rieff, The Case Against Sensitivity, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1990, 120 cited in Post, Racist 
Speech, supra note 40, at 268 n.7 (noting that in the last two years 137 American universi-
ties had passed proscriptions on hate speech). 
 99 See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); UWM Post, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F.Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of 
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
100 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). 
101 Id. at 386. 
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banned only speech “that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite im-
mediate violence.”102  Nevertheless, the Court, per Justice Scalia, held 
that it was unconstitutional to regulate this category of speech in a 
content-discriminatory manner.  The fact that “fighting words” are 
considered low-value speech, Justice Scalia explained, did not mean 
that “they are . . . entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they 
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to 
their distinctively proscribable content.”103  The decision was widely 
understood to close the door on hate speech regulation. 
The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Virginia v. Black, however, 
may have reopened it slightly.  In Black, the Court held that a cross 
burning that is intended as a threat can constitutionally be pro-
scribed.  To square this conclusion with R.A.V.’s holding that cross 
burnings (among other forms of symbolic expression) cannot be pro-
scribed when calculated to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the 
basis of race, the Court cited dicta from R.A.V.  Justice Scalia had ex-
plained that content-based discrimination within low-value categories 
of speech is permissible “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimina-
tion consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at 
issue is proscribable.”104  The Black court found that threats conveyed 
by burning a cross are a particularly invidious kind of threat and so 
can be singled out for regulation in accordance with this principle.105  
The Black opinion also distinguished R.A.V., holding that unlike the 
ordinance in the previous case, the Virginia statute applied without 
regard to the viewpoint of the cross burner:  “It does not matter 
whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate because 
of the victim’s race, gender, or religion . . . .”106  Scholars have ques-
tioned the cogency of this distinction;107 what is clear from reading 
the Black decision, in any event, is that the tension between anti-
102 Id. at 380 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)). 
103 Id. at 383–84. 
104 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361 (2003) (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388). 
105 “The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to 
intimidate,” the Black court held, “because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form 
of intimidation.”  Id. at 363. 
106 Id. at 362. 
107 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech:  Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the 
Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 603–07 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s change in posi-
tion between R.A.V. and Black); Stephen G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, In-
timidation, and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1295–1310 (2005) (discussing the 
same issue); Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning—Hate Speech as Free Speech: A Comment on Vir-
ginia v. Black, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2004) (discussing the same issue); Frederick 
Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment:  The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 
SUP. CT. REV. 197, 207–09 (discussing the same issue). 
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subordination and free speech values remains acute.  The opinion at-
tempts to adhere to the central doctrinal requirements of free 
speech:  racist threats can only be banned because they constitute an 
especially pernicious harm, not because of the “idea” of racism itself.  
But at the same time, its holding is driven by an awareness that cer-
tain words and symbols pose an especially grave threat to the com-
munity precisely because of the history of racism.  The Court’s find-
ing that cross burnings are an especially potent class of threats was 
based in large part on a survey of the history of the Ku Klux Klan.  Af-
ter reviewing the extensive pattern of racially motivated violence un-
dertaken by the KKK throughout the twentieth century,108 the Court 
found that “the history of violence associated with the Klan shows that 
[when a target is threatened with a burning cross,] the possibility of 
injury or death is not just hypothetical.”109  Cross burnings “had spe-
cial force given the long history of Klan violence.”110  The Court con-
cluded, “when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any mes-
sages are more powerful.”111  Black thus appeared to give new life not 
only to the doctrinal possibility of regulating hate speech but to the 
very theories of signification and interpretation upon which propo-
nents of regulation have long relied.112  The Supreme Court had fi-
nally recognized the nexus between history, meaning, and intimida-
tion. 
In the wake of 2007’s epidemic of hate speech incidents involving 
nooses, a number of states have passed laws that ban the display of a 
noose with the intent to intimidate.113  According to Black’s revision of 
R.A.V., such laws are constitutionally permissible because they ban 
threats made using a symbol that, because of its historical association 
with discriminatory violence, is particularly threatening and disrup-
tive of the social order.  These statutes would run afoul of R.A.V., of 
course, were they to predicate criminality on the intent to harm or 
intimidate because of the target’s race, gender, sexual orientation or 
religion.  This trend suggests that we may see regulation of threaten-
ing expression symbol-by-symbol, word-by-word, supported by legisla-
tive or judicial findings in each case that the symbol or word is associ-
ated with historical oppression and so especially tends to provoke 
outbursts of violence.  But can a statute that prohibits burning a cross 
108 Black, 538 U.S. at 352–57. 
109 Id. at 357. 
110 Id. at 355. 
111 Id. at 357. 
112 See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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with the intent to intimidate really be said to be “viewpoint neutral”?  
Is it not effectively decreeing that intimidation based on racist beliefs 
is unworthy of a place in public discourse?  Proponents of free speech 
may eventually force a confrontation with the logically awkward com-
promise Black forged between anti-subordination and free speech.  
The effort to steer a middle path between anti-subordination and free 
speech, however, need not lead us back into these tortuous questions, 
for there is another option.  The government might make non-
regulatory interventions against hate speech through its own expres-
sion. 
D.  A Definitional Note 
It will be useful, before going forward, to state clearly the defini-
tion of hate speech that this Article adopts and to situate that defini-
tion against the background of the arguments and doctrine just dis-
cussed.  Matsuda’s definition is a good starting point.  To recap, she 
defines hate speech as expression that conveys a persecutory, hateful, 
and degrading message of the inferiority of a historically oppressed 
group.114  Hate speech includes both totemic words and symbols, even 
if used casually, and discourse that, although it does not employ a 
hot-button epithet or symbol, nevertheless conveys a persecutory 
message of inferiority.  It also includes threats of violence motivated 
by the target’s membership in a group of historically oppressed per-
sons, although since such speech can be regulated under Black, this 
sub-category is of less interest for the purposes of this Article. 
This definition may not satisfy free speech advocates, who will 
worry that it is vague at the borders and risks encompassing protected 
speech.  For example, one common objection to anti-hate speech 
codes115 that could be raised here is that speech that is “degrading” 
may more properly be classed as simply offensive speech, which the 
First Amendment protects.116  There are, indeed, real difficulties with 
establishing a clear definition of hate speech.  Rather than a cause for 
consternation at the outset, however, this fact is one more reason to 
explore a non-regulatory approach to combating hate speech.  Defi-
114 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
115 See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
a school district’s anti-harassment policy was overbroad for “prohibiting disparaging 
speech directed at a person’s ‘values’”). 
116 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Speech is often provocative and chal-
lenging.  It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling ef-
fects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not 
absolute . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment . . . .”). 
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nitional questions are especially important in First Amendment doc-
trine because, to avoid a “chilling effect,” speakers need to know the 
precise perimeters of the banned category of speech.117  Government 
speech focused on combating hate speech, however, which places no 
affirmative limitations on individual expression, need not share this 
preoccupation. 
II.  GOVERNMENT SPEECH:  SOME FORMS OF INTERVENTION 
Recall George Bush’s admonition, made in the wake of a year of 
highly publicized noose incidents, that speakers should understand 
the violent history in which the noose is implicated and avoid using 
the symbol as a prank or threat.  Or consider if a similar statement 
were made by Barack Obama now.118  Such a statement offers some-
thing to both the anti-subordination and the free speech camps.  The 
President lends his authority to the cause of anti-subordination:  he 
makes a strong statement that certain words and symbols can acquire 
a particular power to threaten or wound through their historical as-
sociation with discrimination and violence, and he asserts that speak-
ers should refrain from using these freighted terms.  On the other 
hand, his act respects free speech values because his imprecation is 
not regulation:  it is not backed up by threat of punishment if speak-
ers choose to ignore his plea.  Of course, such a statement also may 
be found lacking by each camp:  the anti-subordination camp will see 
hortatory statements by executive officials as too weak an interven-
tion, while free speech absolutists will worry that the cumulative effect 
of abundant precatory speech can amount to a kind of censorship 
through indoctrination.  But government speech steers a middle path 
between inaction and censorship. 
A public statement by the executive is only one of many expressive 
options available to the government.  Government speech is a broad 
117 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 115 (1980) (noting that the goal of speech 
protection can be “defeated . . . by defining the categories of unprotected speech . . . too 
vaguely, thereby inviting . . . erosion”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Ob-
scenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (observing that under a two-tier system of free speech 
protection, a great deal of weight is placed on the accuracy of our definitions of catego-
ries—“[i]f the obscene is constitutionally subject to ban because it is worthless, it must fol-
low that the obscene can include only that which is worthless”). 
118 Cf. Obama Speaks Out on “Noose” Magazine Cover, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 18, 2008, 
http://www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&story=/www/story/01-18-
2008/0004739124&edate= (quoting then-presidential candidate Obama:  “We have to 
have a culture that understands that there’s nothing funny about a noose.  That’s a pro-
found history that people have been dealing with and those memories are ones that can’t 
be played with.”). 
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category that includes any government action that communicates or 
subsidizes the communication of a particular message.  It encom-
passes activities from appropriating taxpayer money to campaign for 
or against specific legislative measures to deciding who gets access to 
public fora such as theatres and broadcasting frequencies to offering 
a program of subsidies for expression—for example, funding for the 
arts—that makes content-based decisions among qualified applicants.  
The government can be said to “speak” when it pays for speech di-
rectly, when it provides access to public property for the communica-
tion of a given message, or when an elected official voices her opin-
ion on a given issue. 
This Part will catalogue a number of constitutionally permissible 
forms of government expression that could be used to intervene 
against hate speech.  They are:  1) precatory and hortatory speech by 
government officials and bodies, 2) commemorative expression, 3) 
public education, 4) government subsidies of private speech and se-
lective control of expression in non-public fora, and 5) advisory and 
investigatory statements.  The list offered is not by any means exhaus-
tive.  Rather, the examples have been chosen to highlight important 
theoretical and doctrinal questions.  For each type of government 
speech proposed, two questions will be addressed:  first, briefly, how 
would this kind of government intervention work as a means of de-
terring or discouraging hate speech?  Second, is it constitutional?  
What limits, if any, does doctrine impose?  Discussion of the effec-
tiveness of the various types of speech will be preliminary here and 
taken up at greater length in the next Part.  The central goal of this 
Part is to lay out an array of permissible options. 
The First Amendment gives the government a great deal of lati-
tude to engage in its own expression.  As the Supreme Court declared 
recently in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, “[t]he Free Speech Clause 
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate 
government speech.”119  Commentators have generally agreed that it 
makes little sense to think of the government as having a right to 
speak, in the sense of an entitlement that would outweigh a citizen’s 
First Amendment right even in the public forum.120  But both courts 
and scholars have agreed that, by virtue of necessity, the govern-
ment’s ability to speak cannot be unduly hampered.121  Government 
119 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
120 See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS:  POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 42–50 (1983). 
121 See id. at 41 (“It is absurd . . . in the modern contexts, to adopt the position that govern-
ment speech, in its many manifestations and irrespective of its advantages, is an illegiti-
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speech doctrine, accordingly, draws a distinction between occasions 
when the government is properly understood to be speaking as a par-
ticipant in the marketplace of ideas and those when it is acting as a 
regulator of private speech.  When it regulates, the government is 
subject to strict limitations about content- and viewpoint-neutrality.  
But norms of content- and viewpoint-neutrality do not apply when 
the government is itself a participant in public debate, whether an 
elected official speaks herself or the government subsidizes expres-
sion.  As the Supreme Court wrote in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors 
of the University of Virginia, “when the government appropriates public 
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say 
what it wishes [and] it may take . . . appropriate steps to ensure that 
its message is neither garbled nor distorted.”122
The distinction between government as regulator of and govern-
ment as participant in the marketplace of ideas, however, proves dif-
ficult to draw in a consistent manner.  Over the last several decades, 
the Court has attempted to distinguish between:  1) when a given 
publicly owned space is a public forum and when it is not,123 2) when 
the government may and may not require individuals to convey its 
mate enterprise in a liberal democratic state.  To do so would strip government of a pri-
mary means of protecting and enhancing democratic values, . . . of improving its leader-
ship capacity; of enforcing its public policies; and in the end, of securing its ability to sur-
vive.”); Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 606 (“[T]here can be no room for a non-religious 
establishment clause. . . .  Government has legitimate interests in informing, in educating, 
and in persuading. . . .  An approach that would invalidate all controversial government 
speech would seriously impair the democratic process.”). 
122 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). Explaining the apparent tension between this degree of lati-
tude and the general First Amendment prohibition on content discrimination, Robert 
Post usefully distinguishes between managerial domains and public discourse.  When the 
government is working to “achieve objectives that have been democratically agreed 
upon,” it may place limitations on the expression of individuals who serve as its agents, 
and ordinary First Amendment norms such as viewpoint-neutrality do not apply.  But 
when individuals are participating in public discourse, their freedom to express their 
views must be protected.  Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 27, at 164–76. 
123 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (holding that a state university had 
created a public forum by making its facilities available to student groups and so could 
not constitutionally exclude religious groups from that forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828, 838 n.10 (1976) (holding that a military base may constitutionally exclude a group 
who wished to distribute political pamphlets and make political speeches, even if the mili-
tary has invited other speakers onto the base, because a military base is not a public fo-
rum); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (holding that the city 
need not allow political advertising in its transit system because a public forum had not 
been created by selling advertising in buses); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana:  
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 238 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rul-
ings regarding speech in public fora). 
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messages,124 and 3) when a given program simply subsidizes speech to 
convey the government’s message and when it regulates the expres-
sion of private individuals.125  The specific holdings and doctrinal tests 
in this area are animated by two central concerns:  ensuring govern-
ment neutrality when speech in a given forum is properly considered 
“public discourse,” and ensuring that the government is not coercing 
individual speakers.  The overarching principle is that the govern-
ment should not be telling people what to say, whether by excluding 
speakers from debate when they have the wrong viewpoint or by forc-
ing them to express the right one.  Despite this doctrinal concern 
with preventing coercion, in practice some constitutionally permissi-
ble forms of government expression approach regulation.  They lay 
down an explicit norm, and non-government speakers are given to 
understand that adverse consequences might follow upon violation of 
it. 
Some of the more direct, and perhaps more effective, interven-
tions against hate speech may therefore raise substantial free speech 
concerns.  The examples that follow are roughly ordered along a 
continuum from those that raise virtually no serious questions of First 
Amendment doctrine or principle to those that present grave con-
cerns for free speech—in other words, from precatory to quasi-
prohibitive.  As we will see, however, it will at times be difficult to 
identify the point at which a form of government speech crosses the 
line from imprecation to coercion. 
124 Compare, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding 
that the state may not require students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance), and Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the state of New Hampshire could not re-
quire unwilling citizens to display the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their license 
plates), with Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (holding that the gov-
ernment may compel citizens to subsidize a given government message), and Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (holding that a deputy district attorney can constitu-
tionally be disciplined for complaining and later testifying that a search warrant had been 
improperly obtained because “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions.”). 
125 See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that the 
government could constitutionally require that the NEA take into account “general stan-
dards of decency” when making decisions about which artists will receive public funding 
for their work); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (upholding a statute that speci-
fied that all projects funded by Title X of the Public Health Service Act are forbidden to 
“encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning”); Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 541 (1983) (upholding a statute 
that exempted veterans’ organizations from a general prohibition on lobbying by tax-
exempt organizations). 
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A.  Precatory and Hortatory Statements by Government Officials and Bodies 
This category contains government speech that states an express 
position on how citizens should speak without making any binding 
rule or offering any particular subsidy.  President Bush’s statement 
about nooses is one example of a precatory statement by a govern-
ment official.  The category is, however, broad and runs from the 
purely hortatory, such as a condemnation of noose “pranks,” to 
speech that maps out a government agenda and so may predict, or 
even set in motion, more direct reprisals for engaging in the con-
demned speech.  The examples considered here—including Con-
gressional resolutions and statements guiding prosecutorial discre-
tion—demonstrate not only the variety of ways the government, 
without passing laws or offering grants, routinely endorses or con-
demns certain ways of speaking, but also that precatory speech can 
have a greater impact on individual speakers than may at first be ap-
parent. 
To begin with the purely hortatory mode:  it is common for ex-
ecutive officials to speak out in response to high profile incidents to 
condemn racist speech.  New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 
for example, made condemnatory statements after a noose was hung 
on a professor’s office door at Columbia Teachers College.126  Legisla-
tive and judicial officials also commonly engage in precatory speech.  
Indeed, in response to the outbreak of noose incidents in 2007, the 
entire United States federal legislature voiced its disapprobation.  In 
December of that year, both the House and the Senate passed resolu-
tions citing the history of lynching in America and stating that “the 
hanging of nooses is a horrible [the Senate used the word ‘reprehen-
sible’] act when used for the purpose of intimidation.”127  And often, 
126 See Gootman & Baker, supra note 5. 
127 S. Res. 396, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 826, 110th Cong. (2007).  The House Resolu-
tion reads: 
Whereas in the past two months, nooses have been found in a North Carolina high 
school, a Home Depot in New Jersey, a Louisiana school playground, the campus 
of the University of Maryland, a Columbia University professor’s office door and a 
factory in Houston, Texas; 
Whereas the Southern Poverty Law Center has recorded between 40 and 50 sus-
pected hate crimes involving nooses since September; 
Whereas since 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has filed 
more than 30 lawsuits that involve the displaying of nooses in places of employ-
ment; 
Whereas nooses are reviled by many Americans as racist symbols of lynchings that 
were once all too common; 
Whereas according to Tuskegee Institute, more than 4,700 people were lynched 
between 1882 and 1959 in a campaign of terror led by the Ku Klux Klan; 
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members of the judiciary have, in court opinions, explicitly con-
demned hate speech at the same time that they protect it.  Writing 
for the Seventh Circuit in the Skokie case, for example, Judge Pell 
declared (before going on to affirm the right of Nazi demonstrators 
to march in the village of Skokie, Illinois), “We would hopefully sur-
prise no one by confessing personal views that NSPA’s beliefs and 
goals are repugnant to the core values held generally by residents of 
this country, and, indeed, to much of what we cherish in civiliza-
tion.”128
As the label “precatory” suggests, the most basic way such inter-
ventions might be expected to counter hate speech is by pleading 
with members of the public to think carefully about the way they use 
language.  Public officials possess moral authority—some more than 
others—and individuals may heed the message that hateful language 
can inflict serious harms when it comes from a local or national lead-
er.  In a more general sense, such statements help to create a climate 
of value in which hate speech is disapproved.  Some obvious objec-
tions can be anticipated:  is it realistic to suppose that an individual 
who is inclined to use hateful language will be swayed by a plea made 
by a public official?  Is it not more likely that many of those who use 
hate speech do so at least in spite of or even because of the fact that 
they are violating norms of civilized discourse?  These objections will 
be discussed in detail below; for now, it is worth at least acknowledg-
ing the possibility that government speech might effect straightfor-
ward suasion. 
The way the Supreme Court framed its holding in Virginia v. Black 
also made it possible for precatory government speech to interact di-
Whereas the number of dead lynching victims in the United States exceeds the 
amount of people killed in the horrible attack on Pearl Harbor (2,333 dead) and 
Hurricane Katrina (1,836 dead) combined; and 
Whereas African-Americans, as well as Italians, Jews, and Mexicans, have com-
prised the vast majority of lynching victims and only when we erase the terrible 
symbols of the past can we finally begin to move forward: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that— 
(1) the hanging of nooses is a horrible act when used for the purpose of intimida-
tion and which under certain circumstances can be criminal; 
(2) this conduct should be investigated thoroughly by Federal authorities; and 
(3) any criminal violations should be vigorously prosecuted. 
  H.R. Res. 826. 
128 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978).  Judge Pell went on:  “As judges 
sworn to defend the Constitution, however, we cannot decide this or any case on that ba-
sis.  Ideological tyranny, no matter how worthy its motivation, is forbidden as much to 
appointed judges as to elected legislators.”  Id.  Catharine MacKinnon calls such an ap-
proach the “‘speech you hate’ test:  the more you disagree with the content, the more 
important it becomes to protect it.  You can tell you are being principled by the degree to 
which you abhor what you allow.”  MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 75. 
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rectly with the regulation of hate speech.  The Court upheld the cen-
tral prohibition contained in Virginia’s anti-cross-burning statute on 
the theory that the First Amendment allows content-based discrimi-
nation within low-value categories of speech when the content-based 
standard singles out the most harmful or valueless instances of speech 
in that category.  In order for a legislature to come to such a conclu-
sion, and for courts to accept their reasoning as valid, there must be 
some sense of consensus that hate speech is especially harmful, both 
to the victims and to the polity as a whole.  The repeated iteration of 
this conviction by elected officials can help forge and give voice to 
that consensus. 
An example taken from the Establishment Clause context suggests 
that legislatures might also try to directly influence ongoing litiga-
tion.  In 1997 both the House and the Senate passed resolutions stat-
ing their view that the Ten Commandments “have had a significant 
impact on the development of the fundamental legal principles of 
Western Civilization” and “set forth a code of moral conduct, obser-
vance of which is universally acknowledged to promote respect for 
our system of laws and the good of society.”129  The resolutions were 
passed with the stated intent of expressing Congress’s support for 
Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore’s display of the Ten Com-
mandments in his courtroom, which was at the time the subject of 
litigation.  They speak directly to the application of the Lemon test to 
public displays and monuments that might be understood to violate 
the Establishment Clause:  a crucial issue in such cases is whether the 
installation’s meaning can be understood as endorsing religion.130  
Congress intervened to express its view that the Ten Commandments 
have important secular meaning and that their display does not vio-
late the Establishment Clause.  In turn, the Supreme Court cited 
these resolutions in a subsequent case upholding the constitutionality 
of a similar display of the Decalogue.131  Precatory speech by govern-
ment officials, then, can influence the application of legal doctrine by 
the courts.  Statements made by members of the executive or legisla-
tive branches about the especial virulence of hate speech could simi-
129 S. Con. Res. 13, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. Con. Res. 31, 105th Cong. (1997). 
130 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that a 
court, in assessing whether a given installation or display is an unacceptable endorsement 
of religion, must consider both its subjective and objective meanings). 
131 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (citing the Congressional resolutions 
after observing that “[t]he Executive and Legislative Branches have also acknowledged 
the historical role of the Ten Commandments”). 
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larly pave the way for prosecuting such speech under statues pat-
terned after Virginia’s anti-cross-burning law. 
In general, no significant First Amendment or other constitu-
tional problems are presented by the purely hortatory speech of pub-
lic officials.  No individual is restrained from speaking as she pleases 
when, say, the President asks the country to stop displaying nooses, so 
it is difficult to imagine the contours of an argument that free speech 
doctrine or values are offended.  Even in cases where officials single 
out an individual speaker for opprobrium, strong doctrines of immu-
nity protect them.  The Speech or Debate Clause renders members of 
the legislature immune from liability so long as they are pursuing 
lawmaking objectives,132 and the doctrines of executive and judicial 
immunity are similarly strong.133
At times, however, precatory statements go beyond condemnation 
and pleas to the citizenry to behave in a certain way; legislative and 
executive officials (and perhaps occasionally the judiciary) will at 
times call for government action.  For example, the House and Sen-
ate anti-noose resolutions called for the investigation and prosecution 
of any criminal violations involving nooses.  Around the same time, 
the House Judiciary Committee held hearings in 2007 at which De-
mocrats lambasted the Justice Department for failing to take ade-
quate action against hate crimes.134  Using this kind of precatory and 
hortatory government speech to intervene against hate speech poses 
more complex First Amendment issues. 
Such speech, though still precatory in the sense that it is merely a 
request for action, might more precisely be described as “agenda-
setting.”  The goal is to instigate the reordering of legislative and pro-
secutorial priorities.  Such statements might legitimately be expected 
to chill speech:  a person who believes that prosecutors are actively 
seeking to punish, under existing criminal laws, individuals who dis-
play nooses would be wise to choose a different way to convey her 
message (whatever it is).  If her message is one of race-based animos-
ity or intimidation, of course, from the anti-subordination perspective 
this “chilling” is desirable.  But if it is unconstitutional under R.A.V. 
to ban hate speech outright, does an announcement by the executive 
that the Justice Department intends to make it a priority to prosecute 
people under existing criminal laws when they use hate speech raise 
constitutional problems? 
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 
(1975) (defining the contours of this immunity). 
133 See EMERSON, supra note 25, at 700–08. 
134 Marisol Bello, Copycat Nooses Raise Outcry, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2007, at 3A. 
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Although it is difficult to establish a claim that prosecutorial dis-
cretion has been abused,135 the selective prosecution of a defendant 
because she has exercised her First Amendment rights does represent 
a constitutional violation.136  In theory, the systematic use of prosecu-
torial discretion to target those who express, for example, anti-gay 
views under statutes of general application would be constitutionally 
impermissible.  Existing federal law and most states’ laws, however, 
already contain provisions criminalizing many instances of intimida-
tion motivated by discrimination based on race, sex, gender identity, 
and other identity-based reasons, and enhancing penalties for com-
mitting other crimes with a discriminatory motive.137  These laws have 
withstood constitutional challenge.138  Making it a priority to apply 
these laws in cases where—as was urged by the House Judiciary 
Committee—a noose was used arguably improperly targets a particu-
lar mode of expression.  But assuming a court were to reach the First 
135 In general, separation of powers concerns lead courts to refrain from questioning exer-
cises of prosecutorial discretion.  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).  A de-
fendant may, however, attempt to show that this discretion has been employed in a way 
that violates her constitutional rights.  Id. at 608.  (Most commonly, defendants assert vio-
lations of the Equal Protection Clause.  E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 
464 (1996); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979)).  Courts begin with 
a presumption that the prosecutor has validly used her discretion, and it can only be re-
butted with “clear evidence.”  Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65; see also McClesky v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (“Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, 
we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has 
been abused.”). 
136 See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 707 n.4 (1986) (stating that a viable claim of se-
lective prosecution might exists if a district attorney were shown to have a “speech sup-
pressive motivation or policy”). 
137 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2009) (making it a crime to willfully cause bodily injury to any 
person (or to attempt to do so) because of, inter alia, his race, color, religion, national 
origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2004) (enhancing the penalty for any crime when the vic-
tim or property was selected because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person).  The 
Obama Administration has made prosecuting hate crimes a priority.  Carrie Johnson, Jus-
tice Official Vows Action on Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A6, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/21/AR2009122103
333.html.  In 2009, Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Matthew Shepard 
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which expanded federal hate crimes law 
to cover crimes motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived gender identity and elimi-
nated the requirement that the victim be engaged in a federally protected activity.  Mat-
thew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. E, 
§§ 4701–4713, 123 Stat. 2835–44 (2009). 
138 18 U.S.C. § 245 has been held a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s ban on badges and incidents of slavery.  United States v. Allen, 341 
F.3d 870, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provision has been 
upheld against First Amendment challenge.  Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
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Amendment question, having gotten beyond the general deference 
to prosecutorial discretion, such a content-based exercise of discre-
tion could be defended under Virginia v. Black.  Just as a state legisla-
ture can single out those threats it deems especially virulent for pro-
hibition, it is arguably permissible to prosecute those acts of 
discriminatory intimidation and violence that are perpetrated using a 
symbol that the prosecutor deems especially pernicious.139  While pre-
catory speech designed to solicit government action in the form of 
increased prosecutions of hate speech might well be expected to chill 
the use of certain words and symbols, then, neither that speech nor 
any ensuing government action could likely be barred by a court. 
It will be difficult to draw a clear line between “hortatory” execu-
tive speech and “agenda-setting” executive speech.  A President might 
say, in the wake of an incident like that involving Tiger Woods or the 
“Jena Six,” that he condemns racist speech and that he expects all 
members of his administration to share his condemnation.  A prose-
cutor hearing such a statement and taking it to heart might then 
seize any opportunity to demonstrate explicit disapprobation of hate 
speech—for example, choosing to prosecute most assiduously and 
publicly threats against an African American President’s life that are 
couched in virulently racist terms.  So speech that is hortatory in form 
may have the capacity to shape agendas. 
One final observation on precatory government speech:  although 
our discussion of this category ends here, the division between this 
least coercive kind of government speech and the most coercive is 
admittedly artificial.  The advisory and investigatory statements that 
arguably present the greatest danger to First Amendment freedoms 
are, in a sense, merely precatory speech.  So the catalog of possible 
interventions will come full circle. 
B.  Commemorative Expression 
Government speech routinely takes the form of commemorative 
expression:  the erection of monuments, the naming of official holi-
days and other commemorative days, or the choice of whom to por-
tray on postage stamps and currency.  All of these forms of speech are 
139 Such an argument would, however, be in tension the First Amendment’s general rule 
against giving significant discretion to law enforcement officials in speech-related matters.  
The First Amendment’s prohibition on vagueness, for example, is founded in part on the 
principle that “[a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, 
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). 
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intended to mold the values of the citizenry.  As Sanford Levinson 
has explained in his thoughtful book Written in Stone, one crucial task 
of the government is to forge a sense of community in a society that is 
fractured by innumerable differences.  Monuments, flags, images, 
and mottos on coinage and stamps, are all means through which the 
government fashions an image of community, or “ways by which re-
gimes of all stripes take on a material form and attempt to manufac-
ture a popular consciousness conducive to their survival.”140  The gov-
ernment therefore selects which values to legitimate and which 
persons to make into emblems of the community.  The Supreme 
Court recently acknowledged as much in Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum, writing that for placement in public parks, “[g]overnment deci-
sionmakers select the monuments that portray what they view as ap-
propriate for the place in question, taking into account such content-
based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture.”141  In its com-
memorative speech, the government’s acts of both inclusion and ex-
clusion convey messages about the meanings of historical events, the 
importance of persons, and, by extension, the dignity and value of 
different groups. 
While similar to executive speech in its hortatory nature, com-
memorative speech also differs from it in important ways.  Com-
memorative speech is, or purports to be, collectively authored.  While 
an elected official speaks before the audience of voters as their repre-
sentative, she also always speaks as herself, vulnerable to rejection by 
voters and able to reject their views in turn.  A monument or image 
on a stamp, on the other hand, speaks as the disembodied voice of 
the community.  Those who dissent from its message can protest 
against it, but in doing so they do not have the assurance of respon-
siveness that direct accountability of the speaker can give.  And be-
cause a primary function of commemorative speech is to mold the 
community’s sense of its shared history and collective identity, the 
prospect of dissenting from it is more fraught.  At the same time that 
it can be understood as an exhortation to embrace the values repre-
sented by the person or event the speech commemorates, it also al-
ways claims to say what the community is.  To reject the statement 
that commemorative speech makes is to situate oneself, at least as of 
140 SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE:  PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 87 
(1998); see also id. at 83–90 (discussing the fallacy of the concept of a neutral state and 
summarizing some of the many ways government speech acts to shape social conscious-
ness). 
141 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009). 
Apr. 2010] HATE SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH 1153 
 
 
the start of debate, as an outsider—as one who does not partake of 
the community’s shared identity. 
Commemorative speech could readily be used to intervene against 
hate speech by molding the public’s sense of collective identity:  it 
can portray the community as one which values difference and does 
not tolerate hate.  The power of commemorative speech to shape 
community identity has already received sustained attention in Levin-
son’s work.  He has explored the manner in which commemorative 
speech that conveys a message of inequality or intolerance can un-
dermine the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  He observes that “[i]t is almost impossible to view” 
states that incorporated the Confederate battle flag into their state 
flags in the 1950s and 60s “as motivated by anything other than the 
desire to engage in ‘the annoyance or oppression of a particular 
class’ that even the Supreme Court of Plessy v. Ferguson pronounced 
itself ready to restrain.”142  Levinson’s book concludes that despite the 
potentially damaging effects of such displays, it is not for courts to 
impose, as from above, rules about what monuments mean and which 
meanings are acceptable.143  He contemplates, however, various ways 
in which the message of a monument to the Confederate dead might 
be countered, including erecting competing monuments.144
Building on this work, this Article proposes a next step:  why not 
turn the tables and use such symbols to promote equality?  We need 
not see commemorative speech as primarily a threat to equality that 
can, at best, be resisted.  If we accept that the images and symbols 
that are endorsed by those in power or that otherwise have wide-
spread currency do in fact alter relations of power between people, 
then commemorative speech might be an effective intervention 
against hate speech. 
Any attempt to use commemorative government speech in this 
way does have to take into account the specific form that commemo-
rative speech takes.  Commemorative speech tends to evoke values 
through synecdoche:  a member of the community stands in for the 
whole, or a single episode from history stands in for a larger period.  
142 LEVINSON, supra note 140, at 100. 
143 Levinson asks “how much we want courts to supply legally privileged readings—backed 
up by the force of the state—of culturally contested icons”; moreover, “whatever the value 
of courts—and constitutions—in limiting tangible oppression, they are quite limited in 
their actual power when what is at stake is the politics of cultural meaning.  I think it un-
wise, as a general matter, to encourage judicial intervention in circumstances where the 
consequences are unlikely genuinely to advance one’s overall social or political agenda 
and, indeed, are likely to provoke an unfortunate backlash.” Id. at 97, 104.   
144 Id. at 111–29. 
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The choice of which individual, which episode, to endow with the aura 
of collective veneration that only the state can confer is what codes 
the monument, stamp, or other emblem with meaning.  To speak in 
the idiom of commemoration, therefore, the government must dis-
cover representative individuals and events that evoke identifiable 
values.  To a certain degree the community will learn the history that 
commemorative speech teaches, so it is not strictly necessary that citi-
zens already embrace the individual or event commemorated as rep-
resentative.  But the form of the message that commemorative speech 
can communicate is somewhat limited:  it tells us that X is worthy of 
admiration, X embodies Y qualities, and we in turn value Y qualities 
in ourselves and our community.  The qualities we are taught to value 
can be abstract—patriotism, valor, learning—or they can be aspects 
of group identity—gender, race, national origin.  Usually both kinds 
of messages are intermingled, so that we learn lessons about who 
constitutes the community at the same time that we learn which val-
ues the community aspires to embody. 
As a form of intervention against hate speech, therefore, com-
memorative speech is a blunt instrument.  It must operate through 
broad claims about representativeness and shared value.  Commemo-
rative speech can work to instantiate the values of equality and dignity 
by elevating members of historically marginalized groups to the status 
of state honoree.  To the extent that citizens internalize the message 
conveyed by, for example, a statue of Martin Luther King, they will 
come to see African Americans as full members of the community 
and equal civil rights for all races as a value to be embraced.  These 
beliefs might then, in turn, shake a speaker’s confidence in the effi-
cacy of hate speech—the less certain she is that a given group is in 
fact subordinate, the less powerful the language of subordination will 
appear to her.  Of course, resistance to the meaning the statue con-
veys could provoke hate speech with renewed energy:  a speaker who 
feels threatened by the ascendancy of a marginalized group might 
cling to hateful speech against them as a way of maintaining her su-
perior status.  But it is possible that over time, commemorative 
speech can contribute to the diffusion of belief in equality. 
Commemorative speech also can have a negative mode, in that it 
can honor victims.  The message of such commemorations is cau-
tionary:  by invoking the memory of individuals who suffered at the 
hands of past members of the community, it reminds present mem-
bers to avoid the perversions of value that allowed acts of persecution 
to take place.  A more specific intervention against hate speech could 
be undertaken by establishing memorials to victims of hate crimes.   
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The message would be to disvalue individual acts of domination 
motivated by prejudice.145
As for the constitutionality of this use of commemorative speech, 
like precatory speech it is largely immune from challenge.  When 
courts confront a case challenging the government in its role as an 
omnipresent arbiter of social and cultural values, they often decline 
to hear the issue.146  The Eleventh Circuit, faced with a Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Alabama’s display of the 
Confederate battle flag over the state house, held that the choice of 
which flag to fly was “political” and not subject to judicial review.147  It 
similarly denied a First Amendment challenge to the inclusion of the 
Confederate battle flag in the Georgia state flag, holding that the 
plaintiff had “pointed to no government action that ‘requires affirma-
tion of a belief and an attitude of mind.’”148  As the Supreme Court 
145 One objection to memorials to victims of hate crimes is that they perpetuate an image of 
members of marginalized groups as victims.  This is a posture which rights activists have 
historically been eager to transcend. 
146 The major exception to this rule is the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court’s Es-
tablishment Clause cases represent perhaps its most sustained effort to come to terms 
with the potentially coercive nature of symbolic expression, in particular the display of 
monuments and other installations in public spaces.  In Lynch v. Donnelly, for example, 
Justice O’Connor, concurring, evaluated the significance of the display of a crèche in a 
park:  “Endorsement [of a particular religion] sends a message to nonadherents that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.  
Disapproval sends the opposite message.”  465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring).  She proposed that whether the message sent by public monuments and instal-
lations is one of endorsement of a given religion, and so a violation of the Lemon test, be 
evaluated by determining their “objective” significance to the community.  Id. at 690.  
However, as Steven Shiffrin observes, there is no Establishment Clause limiting non-
religious government expression.  Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 606. 
147 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Augustus v. Sch. Bd. of Escambia 
County, 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court’s order enjoining school 
district from using Confederate flag and the name “Rebels” for the school’s athletic 
teams).
148 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 531 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943)).  The court went on:   
 “For example, there is no evidence that Georgia requires appellant to carry or 
display the flag or to participate in ceremonies honoring the flag.  The mere fact 
that appellant may on some occasions be required to enter public buildings that 
fly the Georgia flag does not infringe upon his First Amendment rights because 
entering public buildings does not manifest any particular attitude or belief and 
does not associate appellant with the flag’s message.”   
  Id.   
   Levinson too concludes that there is no valid legal argument by which a court could 
order, for example, the South Carolina government to abandon the Confederate battle 
flag as a public symbol.  Although he concedes that convincing arguments have been 
made that the Fourteenth Amendment provides the basis for a challenge to monuments 
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held in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, “[p]ermanent monuments dis-
played on public property typically represent government speech,”149 
and as such are not subject to the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause.150  The First Amendment, outside of the area of religion, does 
not command government neutrality, and the state is allowed to 
promote specific values in the architecture of public space. 
C.  Education 
One obvious way that the government can speak out to inhibit or 
undermine hate speech is to devote time in school curricula to the 
relevant issues.  Education is widely understood to be a primary way 
in which government inculcates values in its citizens.  Why not com-
mit political capital and government funds to designing and imple-
menting programs in public schools, the goal of which is to reduce 
the incidence of hate speech?  In the wake of the 2007 string of noose 
incidents, Representative Steve Cohen of Tennessee suggested pre-
cisely this tactic:  he proposed that, as one aspect of its response, 
Congress should explore inserting provisions for education about the 
history of discrimination into the No Child Left Behind Act.151
A significant number of cases involving hate speech arise in the 
school context.152  Anecdotal evidence suggests that in at least some 
portion of these incidents, the students using racist or otherwise hate-
ful language fail to understand fully its significance.153  Education 
about the history of discrimination and violence against marginalized 
groups that emphasizes the interrelation between language and sub-
ordination would dispel such ignorance.  If lack of knowledge is in-
that perpetuate reverence for a racist and oppressive regime, LEVINSON, supra note 140, at 
94, he doubts that such legal challenges are feasible or advisable.  Id. at 77–90. 
149 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) . 
150 Id. at 1131. 
151 Jena 6 and the Role of Federal Intervention in Hate Crimes and Race-Related Violence in Public 
Schools:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 63 (2007) (Representative 
Cohen asked Professor Charles Ogletree:  “Do you know if there’s anything that we 
should look into putting into the No Child Left Behind Law, if there’s anything there 
now, maybe to mandate education that requires courses on tolerance or some courses on 
civil rights history, Holocaust history or things like that to teach all children in the United 
States about such episodes of racial and ethnic intolerance?”). 
152 The incidents that sparked the “Jena 6” controversy are a good example.  See also West v. 
Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 2000) (chronicling a series of in-
cidents of race-based conflict and harassment at a high school). 
153 See, e.g., In re Ryan M., No. A111901, 2006 WL 2054071 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2006) (in-
volving a student prosecuted under threat statute for giving pro-KKK literature to African 
American student; he later explained that he did not comprehend the threatening impli-
cations of his flyer). 
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deed at the root of some incidents of hate speech, then the number 
of such incidents would be reduced overall.  And in general, inculcat-
ing in students an understanding that language can be beneficially 
used as a medium that expresses and encourages toleration or invidi-
ously used as a medium that enacts and perpetuates discrimination 
would, in the long term, give us a citizenry that uses language more 
sensitively and responsibly. 
Unlike precatory and commemorative speech, however, govern-
ment speech through education raises significant First Amendment 
questions.  The area in which judges have perhaps made the greatest 
effort to develop standards distinguishing acceptable government 
control over the instantiation of values from improper censorship is 
education.  It is widely recognized that the government has discretion 
to design curricula, establish or take away extracurricular activities, 
select the contents of school libraries,154 and indeed under certain 
circumstances proscribe speech that would, in other contexts, be pro-
tected.155  At the same time, some interventions by school authorities 
have nevertheless been struck down as inappropriate efforts to en-
force an orthodoxy of belief. 
The law regarding whether schools may institute outright prohibi-
tions on hate speech is unsettled.  Students retain First Amendment 
rights in school,156 but those rights are not coextensive with the rights 
of an adult participating in public debate.157  In recent years, chal-
lenges to school anti-hate speech and anti-harassment policies have 
had differing outcomes in the circuit courts.  In the 2000 decision 
West v. Derby Unified School District, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the con-
154 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (explaining while the state has the 
power to regulate schools, it may not prohibit teachers from teaching theories of which 
the state simply disapproves); Pierce v. Hill Military Acad., 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (reit-
erating that the State has the power to regulate schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
402 (1923) (noting that the power of the State to compel attendance and make reason-
able regulations “is not questioned”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 
(1982) (“We have . . . acknowledged that public schools are vitally important ‘in the 
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,’ and as vehicles for ‘inculcating 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’” (cit-
ing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979))). 
155 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“We have . . . recognized 
that the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.’”). 
156 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (“Our cases make clear that students do not 
‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.’”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment, are available to teachers and students.”). 
157 Morse, 551 U.S. at 403–05; Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681–83 (1986). 
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stitutionality of a school policy forbidding the possession of written or 
printed material that is “racially divisive or creates ill will or hatred,” 
both facially and as applied to a student who had been disciplined for 
drawing a Confederate battle flag.158  The court found that the history 
of high racial tension at the school made it reasonable for school au-
thorities to conclude that the student’s expression threatened to pro-
voke further conflict and so met the requirement, set forth in Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, that student speech 
must “‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge 
upon the rights of other students’” before it can be suppressed.159  
And the Ninth Circuit, in its 2006 decision Harper v. Poway Unified 
School District, found that it was constitutional for a school to require a 
student to remove a T-shirt that read, “Homosexuality Is Shameful,” 
since this speech interfered with the rights of gay and lesbian stu-
dents to be free from harassment in their learning environment.160  In 
contrast, in 2001, the Third Circuit, in Saxe v. State College Area School 
District—with then-Judge Alito writing—found that a school anti-
harassment policy that prohibited, inter alia, “any unwelcome verbal, 
written or physical conduct which offends, denigrates, or belittles an 
individual” on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, gen-
der, sexual orientation, disability, or “other personal characteristics” 
was unconstitutional.161  The court found the policy improper be-
cause there was no showing of threat of a substantial disruption and, 
with respect to Tinker’s provision for banning speech that impinges 
upon the rights of other students, the policy was overbroad.162
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision Morse v. Frederick, however, 
casts doubt on the circuit courts’ application of Tinker’s rule.163  In 
Morse, the Court confirmed that schools are allowed to prohibit 
speech that would be protected in public discourse when that speech 
would disrupt the school’s educational endeavors,164 but it appeared 
to relax Tinker’s requirement that a threat of substantial disruption be 
158 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 2000). 
159 Id. at 1366 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
160 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal 
as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
161 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 202–203, 216–18 (3d Cir. 2001). 
162 Id. at 216–18. 
163 In Harper, Saxe, and West, the circuit courts followed a three-step analysis of speech in the 
school context, holding that speech can be restricted under Tinker if it is substantially dis-
ruptive or impinges upon the rights of others, under Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986), if it is indecent or lewd, or under Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, if it might reasonably 
be taken to be endorsed by the school.  See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1176–77; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 
211–14; West, 206 F.3d at 1366. 
164 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
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shown.  While school administrators may not suppress speech out of 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” or “a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accom-
pany an unpopular viewpoint,”165 the Court explained, a “serious and 
palpable” problem afflicting the student body may justify a ban on 
certain speech.166  Under Morse, then, it is possible that a school could 
simply ban hate speech if administrators reasonably thought that it 
would interfere with the school’s educational task.  On the other 
hand, Morse emphasized that school officials have a legitimate interest 
in preventing drug use and made clear that speech cannot be prohib-
ited simply because it is “offensive,”167 leaving the door open for a 
challenge to an anti-hate speech code. 
If a rule banning hate speech in public schools is of questionable 
validity, what then is the constitutional status of an educational pro-
gram designed to decrease the incidence of hate speech?  The answer 
to this question is, again, unsettled.  On the one hand, such a pro-
gram might be challenged by invoking the 1982 Supreme Court case 
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico.  In Pico, 
the plaintiffs challenged the Board of Education’s removal of ten 
books from the high school and junior high school libraries after 
members of the Board attended a conference held by an organiza-
tion of conservative parents.168  The Court held that this action was a 
violation of the First Amendment, although no theory of why this was 
so or what standard should be used to assess when such violations had 
occurred commanded a majority of the Court.  The plurality opinion, 
written by Justice Brennan, conceded that school boards generally 
have discretion to manage school affairs and even to inculcate values 
in students.169 The plurality stressed that students have a First 
Amendment right to receive information, and it found that this right 
165 Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09). 
166 See id.  The Court also noted that “the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting 
student speech.”  Id. at 406. 
167 Id. at 408. 
168 457 U.S. 853, 856 (1982).  The organization, Parents of New York United (PONYU), dis-
tributed lists of “objectionable” books.  The nine books removed from the high school li-
brary were:  Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Slaughterhouse Five; Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape; Piri 
Thomas, Down These Mean Streets; Langston Hughes, ed., Best Short Stories of Negro Writers; 
Oliver LaFarge, Laughing Boy; Alice Childress, A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ but a Sandwich; Richard 
Wright, Black Boy; Anonymous, Go Ask Alice; and Eldridge Cleaver, Soul On Ice.  The book 
removed from the junior high school library was:  Jerome Archer, ed., A Reader for Writers.  
The board also found that another listed book, Bernard Malamud’s The Fixer, was taught 
to seniors at the high school.  Id. at 856–57 n.3. 
169 Id. at 863–64. 
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was violated by the Board’s action.170 Justice Brennan’s opinion fo-
cused on the unique status of the school library and the act of re-
moval of the books, limiting its holding to this set of facts.171  Justice 
Blackmun, concurring, disputed the analytic usefulness of the plural-
ity’s focus on the library and its distinction between removing books 
and choosing which books to acquire.  He would have rested the find-
ing that the Board’s action violated the First Amendment on its in-
tent:  “the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because 
state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political rea-
sons.”172
Pico may be construed as applying only in the library setting or as 
prohibiting only an act that deprives students of information to which 
they previously had access (removing books rather than refraining 
from buying books).  Under these readings, school administrators 
have full control over school curricula, school boards could freely 
adopt educational programs intended to reduce the incidence of 
hate speech.  If, however, Justice Blackmun’s application of a broad 
intent standard is taken to be the holding of Pico, the dispositive fac-
tor in determining when a First Amendment violation has occurred 
in the school context is the government’s intent.173  An educational 
program that avowedly had the purpose of decreasing the incidence 
of a certain kind of speech might be subject to challenge.174  Indeed, 
170 Id. at 866–67. 
171 Id. at 871–72. 
172 Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justice Blackmun rejected the idea that “the right 
at issue here is somehow associated with the peculiar nature of the school library.”  Id. at 
878.  Chief Justice Burger dissented.  Like Justice Blackmun, he doubted that the plural-
ity’s distinction between removing books and refraining from purchasing books was ca-
pable of principled application; he would have held that the school board’s discretion 
encompassed the ability to select the materials used to educate students.  “[I]f the First 
Amendment commands that certain books cannot be removed,” he asked, “does it not 
equally require that the same books be acquired?  Why does the coincidence of timing be-
come the basis of a constitutional holding?” Id. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
173 See id. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he State may not suppress exposure to 
ideas—for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure to those ideas—absent sufficiently 
compelling reasons.”); see also id. at 871 (Brennan, J.) (“[W]hether petitioners’ removal 
of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First Amendment rights 
depends upon the motivation behind petitioners’ actions.  If petitioners intended by their 
removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, 
and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’ decision, then petitioners have ex-
ercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution.”). 
174 Edward Rubin has recently argued in favor of a “disparagement principle.”  Taking as his 
point of departure Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in the Second Circuit’s disposi-
tion of Pico, on which Justice Blackmun drew in his Supreme Court concurrence, he ar-
gues the constitutional line should be drawn between “criticism” and “disparagement.”  
“Criticism simply states that a particular view is wrong or that it should not be followed.  
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in contrast to Pico, where the central First Amendment right at stake 
for students was the right to receive information, anti-hate speech 
educational initiatives arguably have the objective of suppressing a 
certain category of speech—the impermissibility of which as a gov-
ernment objective is perhaps the most historically well-established as-
pect of First Amendment jurisprudence.  As the plurality wrote in Pi-
co, “[o]ur Constitution does not permit the official suppression of 
ideas.”175  Programs that made their pitch to avoid hateful forms of 
expression in explicit terms—along the lines of “Just Say No” absti-
nence and anti-drug use initiatives—might be especially vulnerable, 
but if an intent standard is to be taken seriously, even a constructive 
educational program designed to educate students about the history 
of hate speech and its consequences might be challenged if that pro-
gram were avowedly aimed at reducing the incidence of hate speech. 
Such an interpretation of Pico is problematic, however.  The exer-
cise of envisioning the application of an intent standard in this con-
text reveals the standard’s limitations.  All education about values en-
tails lessons, implicit or explicit, about how to speak.176  If we posit 
that attributes of the good citizen include toleration for differences, 
respect for others, and a belief in equality, does it make sense to pro-
hibit a school board from deciding that one important manifestation 
of these attributes is the way citizens speak to one another and at-
tempting to foster that manner of speaking? 
Indeed, this outcome would be in tension with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in another case, Bethel School District v. Fraser.  There, 
the Court approved a school’s application of its rule against obscene 
speech in part because one of the valid functions of a school is 
“teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective 
public discourse.”177  The Court further stated that one of the legiti-
mate interests the school had in punishing the student’s speech was 
Disparagement declares that this view is unacceptable, that it is beyond the limits of ac-
ceptable debate and acceptable thought.”  Edward L. Rubin, Jon Newman’s Theory of Dis-
paragement and the First Amendment in the Administrative State, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 249, 
266 (2003). 
175 Pico, 457 U.S.at 871. 
176 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The process of educating our 
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the 
civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. 
Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deport-
ment in and out of class.”). 
177 Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 681 (noting the goals of public educa-
tion include “prepar[ing] students for citizenship” and “inculcat[ing] the habits and 
manners of civility”). 
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that “[b]y glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the 
speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students.”178  If speech can 
be banned outright in order to promote a discourse of mutual re-
spect free of derogatory “verbal content,” then surely a constructive 
educational program may be put in place to discourage hate speech. 
D.  Government Subsidies and Control of Non-Public Fora 
The issue of government subsidies has been a contentious one:  
the Supreme Court’s decisions about when the government may 
condition the receipt of a benefit on the content of the recipient’s 
expression have occasioned an outpouring of critical scholarly com-
mentary.179  The government’s ability to make content-based rules 
about expression in fora that it controls has similarly spawned diffi-
cult cases in the past.180  There are also many ways subsidies might be 
used to combat hate speech and many fora that the government con-
trols.  In this area, it is therefore easier to reverse the order of analy-
sis:  to ask first what kind of intervention against hate speech would 
be constitutionally permissible, and then to ask how such an interven-
tion might work. 
The government is allowed to subsidize speech selectively.181  It 
can also, the Supreme Court has held, condition the receipt of gov-
ernment funding on an individual’s agreement to engage in, or to re-
frain from engaging in, the expression of a particular message.  In 
the controversial 1991 decision Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld a 
statute that specified that all projects funded by Title X of the Public 
Health Service Act are forbidden to “encourage, promote or advocate 
abortion as a method of family planning.”182  The Court held that this 
178 Id. at 683. 
179 See supra note 27. 
180 For example, the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases concerning the validity 
of school rules prohibiting the use of school property or school funds for religious ex-
pression; it has consistently found that these educational fora are public and so content-
based restrictions are invalid.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a university’s policy to withhold funds for the costs of print-
ing a student newspaper with a religious perspective violated the First Amendment); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding 
that a school district’s decision to prohibit a group from using a school to show a reli-
gious film series violated the First Amendment); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) 
(holding that a university’s policy of preventing religious groups from holding meetings 
in university facilities violated the First Amendment). 
181 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding a 
statute that exempted veterans’ organizations from a general prohibition on lobbying by 
tax-exempt organizations). 
182 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991). 
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requirement furthered the government’s legitimate interest in pro-
moting a value judgment it had made.183  In National Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley, the Court similarly held that the government could con-
stitutionally require that the NEA take into account “general stan-
dards of decency” when making decisions about which artists will re-
ceive public funding for their work.184  It would be impossible, Justice 
O’Connor wrote, to carry out the project of government funding for 
the arts while remaining absolutely neutral toward content.185
Justice Scalia, concurring in the result in Finley, asserted that it is 
simply impossible for the government to abridge individual First 
Amendment rights by paying for speech. 
It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of 
view . . .[a]nd it makes not a bit of difference, insofar as either common 
sense or the Constitution is concerned, whether these officials further 
their (and in a democracy, our) favored point of view by achieving it di-
rectly (having government-employed artists paint pictures . . .); or by ad-
vocating it officially (establishing an Office of Art Appreciation . . .); or 
by giving money to others who achieve or advocate it (funding private art 
classes . . .).  None of this has anything to do with abridging anyone’s 
speech.186
On this view, the statute did engage in outright viewpoint discrimina-
tion in administering the NEA program, but it was nevertheless con-
stitutional. 
Commentators have criticized the Court’s holdings in Rust and 
Finley and in particular have assailed the view that government subsi-
dies simply add more speech to the marketplace without restricting 
any individual’s speech.187  But while Rust and Finley were deeply un-
183 Id. at 193. 
184 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998). 
185 Id. at 585.  O’Connor explained:  “Any content-based considerations that may be taken 
into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts fund-
ing.  The NEA has limited resources, and it must deny the majority of the grant applica-
tions that it receives, including many that propose ‘artistically excellent’ projects. . . . As 
the dissent below noted, it would be ‘impossible to have a highly selective grant program 
without denying money to a large amount of constitutionally protected expression.’”
186 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
187 See, e.g., Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 27, at 169–76; Redish & Kessler, supra note 27, 
at 573–81.  The justices themselves have left open the opportunity to rethink this ques-
tion on a case-by-case basis.  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Finley found that the 
decency standard did not constitute viewpoint discrimination on its face, although she re-
served the question of whether it might be applied in a discriminatory way.  See Finley, 524 
U.S. at 586–87 (1997).  Seth Kreimer, examining the problem of government subsidies in 
the First Amendment context and beyond, argues convincingly that the distinction be-
tween “sovereign” actions, which place binding rules on individuals, and “proprietary” ac-
tions, in which the government merely acts as a marketplace participant disposing of its 
property, is illusory.  See Kreimer, supra note 27, at 1314–26.  He suggests that the appro-
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popular decisions among scholars because of the particulars of each 
case, many agree in principle that the government should be able to 
promote its viewpoint when carrying out policy and that it must adopt 
a content-neutral position only when its actions restrict the freedom 
of expression of individual speakers.188
Under public forum doctrine, the government is similarly granted 
latitude to use its property as it chooses to carry out its legitimate 
functions as a government, even when this means making content-
based rules about expression.  But once the government is properly 
understood to be underwriting public discourse, it can no longer dis-
criminate among speakers.  Courts distinguish between “traditional 
public fora” (streets, parks, and so on), created or “limited” public 
fora (spaces into which the government has invited speakers to com-
municate their messages), and non-public fora (government property 
that has not been opened to the public for such use).189  Content- or 
viewpoint-based restrictions placed on speech in traditional public fo-
ra will be subject to strict scrutiny.190 And once the government has 
made its property available to the general public for expressive pur-
poses, the same standards apply.191  The government is not required 
to open all of its property to all speakers, however, and it may selec-
priate analytic paradigm is the difference between a threat and an offer:  “Threats are al-
locations that make a citizen worse off than she otherwise would be because of her exer-
cise of a constitutional right.  Offers merely expand her range of options, leaving the citi-
zen better off.”  Id. at 1300–01. 
188 See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 27, at 168–76, 183–84.  But see Owen Fiss, Comment, 
State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2097, 2101 (1991) (arguing that “[i]t 
is . . . appropriate to assume that the effect of a denial of a grant is roughly equivalent to 
that of a criminal prosecution, in that each tends to silence the artist or, in the case of 
exhibitions, make the artist’s work unavailable to the general, museum-going public”; and 
proposing that judges should assess the constitutionality of allocative decisions by requir-
ing the government to subsidize marginalized viewpoints in order to ensure “a debate on 
national issues that is ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’”). 
189 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (“The exis-
tence of a right of access to public property [depends] on the character of the property at 
issue.”). 
190 See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972) (holding that the state may only place reasonable content-
neutral restrictions, such as time, place, and manner restrictions, on speech in public fo-
ra; “[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible 
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time”); see also Stone, supra 
note 123 (discussing the current status of First Amendment jurisprudence concerning 
individuals’ right to use alternative channels of communication). 
191 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1981) (“[The] Constitution forbids a State to 
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not 
required to create the forum in the first place.”). 
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tively allow speech in fora that it controls up until the point when it 
has admitted a sufficient number of speakers to create a “limited” 
public forum.192  In Greer v. Spock, for example, the Supreme Court 
held that the military could ban political campaigners and protestors 
from Fort Dix because “the business of a military installation like Fort 
Dix [is] to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.”193  The gov-
ernment will have its own messages to communicate to its soldiers—
for example, about military values and proper soldierly conduct—and 
need not allow competing ones air time.  As Steven Shiffrin points 
out, “[i]t is frivolous to posit any general ‘fairness doctrine’ with re-
gard to military training.”194
However contested borderline cases in these areas are, both gov-
ernment subsidy doctrine and public forum doctrine thus establish a 
range of clearly permissible government speech.  The government 
may condition subsidies on the recipient’s willingness to communi-
cate a particular point of view; and the government may communi-
cate whatever message it chooses in fora that it controls.  Both of 
these powers could be used to institute education and advocacy pro-
grams designed to counter hate speech. 
The government can, as Greer holds, impose rules banning hate 
speech within government fora such as military bases.  It is less well-
established that the government can ban hate speech in public work-
places, but the possibility remains open.  Under the rule of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, unless an employee is speaking “as a citizen on a matter of 
public concern,” she has no First Amendment cause of action if her 
employer sanctions her for her speech; when she does speak on a 
matter of public concern, that speech may only be restricted if it 
places a burden on the public employer’s ability to effectively con-
192 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding that a military base may exclude protes-
tors); see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (holding that 
the city need not allow political advertising in its transit system because “[h]ere, we have 
no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public thoroughfare.  In-
stead, the city is engaged in commerce.”). 
193 424 U.S. at 838. 
194 Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 578–79.  Shiffrin explains, for example, that the “military is en-
titled to train soldiers and to instruct them in the perils of drug abuse.  Whether the mili-
tary relies upon its own speakers or invites civilians to promote its point of view should 
have no bearing on whether political candidates may have access to the base.  Indeed, ele-
mentary considerations of orderly administration and military discipline suggest that a 
speaker wanting classroom access to speak about the merits of drug use would properly 
be given short shrift.”  Id. at 578. 
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duct its business.195  The public employer bears a heavier burden of 
justification when it imposes a prior restraint on speech.196  Public 
employers are subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of Title 
VII197 and so must take steps to prevent hostile work environment 
claims198—including, perhaps, instituting rules against the use of hate-
ful language.  And arguably, incidents of hateful speech in the public 
workplace can create a sufficiently toxic atmosphere to impede the 
functioning of the organization.  But at least one lower court has 
found that such interests do not justify a rule prohibiting the display 
of such symbols as the Confederate battle flag.199  At any rate, the gov-
ernment certainly could institute educational programs in the work-
place that, like those proposed for schools, inform employees about 
the history of discrimination that lies behind potent words and sym-
bols. 
The government subsidy area offers room for more far-reaching 
measures.  The government could condition the receipt of subsidies 
on individuals’ willingness not only to refrain from hate speech but 
further to advocate against it.  The government has, on at least one 
past occasion, denied tax breaks to speakers who espouse white su-
premacist views.200  This approach could be made systematic in the 
same way that, during desegregation, the IRS required organizations 
claiming non-profit status to eschew race discrimination.201  Or, if ty-
ing tax-exempt status for non-profits to their willingness to disclaim 
195 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); see also United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 
U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (“Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of pub-
lic employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.”). 
196 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 468. 
197 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-16(a); see also Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1948–
49 (2008); Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 228 n.1 (1988). 
198 See Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that a federal employer may 
be liable on a hostile work environment theory). 
199 See Erickson v. City of Topeka, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (D. Kan. 2002); cf. Cohen v. San Ber-
nardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a public college’s sexual har-
assment policy unconstitutionally vague).  But see Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire 
Dep’t, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1441 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating, in dicta, that “[d]efendants are, 
of course, free to proscribe offensive behavior or language which may result from the 
‘sex-role stereotyping’”). 
200 See Nat’l Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (denying the pub-
lishers of a white supremacist newsletter tax-exempt status as an “educational” organiza-
tion because their materials did not fit within the statutory definition of “educational”; 
the court found that “the fact that there is no reasoned development of the conclu-
sions . . . removes it from any definition of ‘educational’ conceivably intended by Con-
gress.  The material may express the emotions felt by a number of people, but it cannot 
reasonably be considered intellectual exposition.”).
201 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984) (stating that federal tax law denies tax-
exempt status to private schools that discriminate on the basis of race). 
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hateful speech were considered too coercive,202 Congress (or, indeed, 
a state or municipal government) could establish a new tax incentive 
rewarding businesses and non-profits that agreed to educate their 
employees and members about the harms hate speech causes to mi-
norities, women, and LGBT individuals.  Another tactic the govern-
ment can use is to condition its contracts with private employers on 
their willingness to adopt anti-hate speech rules and educational pro-
grams.203
The effect of these measures would be twofold.  They would in-
crease the amount of education citizens receive informing them 
about the history of discrimination in the United States and about 
the harms of using hateful language against that background.  And 
202 See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.  Tax-exempt status, the argument would 
go, is just too important to non-profits for us to view this as a subsidy designed to encour-
age such education.  The Supreme Court has also been reluctant, in the past, to allow 
overly onerous conditions to be attached to the receipt of federal funds.  In FCC v. League 
of Women Voters, the Court struck down a law preventing all noncommercial educational 
stations that receive federal grants from “editorializing.”  468 U.S. 364 (1984).  Even a 
network receiving a nominal amount of federal funding, the Court observed, was entirely 
prohibited from such speech, an arrangement that required too significant a sacrifice of 
free expression for the receipt of federal largesse.  Any requirements that religious or-
ganizations promote certain views or educate their members in certain ways would also 
risk running afoul of the Establishment Clause. 
203 In the wake of a noose incident at a construction site at the Washington Nationals base-
ball stadium, there was talk of proposing a law that would prohibit the city from entering 
into contracts with companies that have proven histories of discrimination.  See Yolanda 
Woodlee, Ex-Worker Calls Noose Incident an Overblown, ‘Stupid Prank,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 
2008, at B5 (quoting D.C. Council member Kwame R. Brown to this effect).  In Philadel-
phia, after the noose incident at the Comcast tower construction site, City Council mem-
bers required unions to draft plans to increase their diversity.  See Vernon Clark, Add Mi-
nority Workers, Unions Told, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2007, at B9.  The extensive use of 
government subsidies to effectively regulate private employers does raise distinct constitu-
tional questions.  Some scholars have argued that existing workplace discrimination law is 
itself unduly restrictive of free speech.  See Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts 
Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech 
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Free-
dom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 687, 689–93 (1997) (discussing this debate and arging that the contraints on expres-
sion imposed by anti-discrimination law are appropriate in the workplace because of its 
unique status as a “‘satellite domain’ of public discourse”).  The Supreme Court has never 
confronted the issue of whether anti-discrimination measures that regulate pure speech 
(as distinct from, for example, coercion or harassment) raise First Amendment problems 
and has continued to uphold them on other grounds.  See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. 
Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206–09 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing the relevant law in the area); Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That 
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (reviewing Harris v. Forklift, 114 S.Ct. 367 
(1993), and referring to it as “the dog that didn’t bark—a clue (but no more than that) 
to some of the First Amendment mysteries surrounding prohibition of sexually harassing 
speech”). 
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they would increase the number of people who work in environments 
with strong norms against hate speech. 
E.  Advisory and Investigatory Statements 
At times the government engages in speech that, though it does 
not lay down a legally binding rule, ultimately has a restrictive or pu-
nitive effect.  Examples include non-binding agency actions, investi-
gations undertaken by agencies or Congress, and publications issuing 
out of such investigations.  In all of these cases, individual speakers 
are given to understand that if they violate the norm the government 
has articulated, adverse consequences may or will follow.  None of 
these forms of government expression, however, is clearly unconstitu-
tional. 
Agencies routinely issue advisory letters, write interpretive rules, 
make findings on factual issues, and take other kinds of action that, 
though they may caution individuals and businesses against certain 
kinds of behavior, do not have binding legal force.  Often, these ac-
tions cannot be challenged until they are enforced against some-
one.204  At the same time, they may have a cognizable “chilling” effect 
on speech.  For example, the FCC publishes a “policy statement” that 
sets forth the agency’s position on indecency in broadcasting and lists 
quotations that it considers indecent and patently offensive.205  
Broadcasters are advised to steer well clear of similar statements.  The 
National Hispanic Media Coalition has recently called upon the FCC 
to investigate anti-Hispanic hate speech on the radio, and it includes 
in its definition of hate speech “false facts” that create a climate of 
prejudice.206  Eugene Volokh points out that even non-regulatory FCC 
204 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Forum, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1445 
(2004) (“Guidance is relatively cheap to produce; it does not require the agency to pre-
sent its view to the public for comment or to a court for evaluation.  Of course, it also 
does not formally bind any particular actor or group of actors, but it may still be effective 
at influencing conduct.  A party attempting to challenge the terms of the guidance will 
probably have a difficult time—a court may decide that a challenge is not ‘ripe’ until the 
agency takes an action based on the guidance.”). 
205 See, e.g., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT, FCC 01-90, INDUSTRY GUIDANCE ON 
THE COMMISSION’S CASE LAW INTERPRETING 18 U.S.C. § 1464 AND ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
REGARDING BROADCAST INDECENCY (2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Enforcement/Orders/2001/fcc01090.pdf. 
206 Petition for Inquiry Filed on Behalf of the National Hispanic Media Coalition, Jan. 28, 
2009, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Clinics/ipr/documents/PetforInquiry-
HateSpeech.pdf. 
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action in this regard could chill speech since radio stations that are 
found to rig or slant the news can lose their broadcasting license.207
Even more aggressive tactics were undertaken in the 1980s by the 
Department of Justice under Attorney General Edwin Meese.  Meese 
established the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, an 
investigative body.  After hearing testimony that a number of large 
publishers and retail stores were producing and distributing pornog-
raphy, the Commission sent letters to companies whose names had 
been mentioned on Department of Justice letterhead informing 
them that it had been alleged that they were purveying pornography 
and advising them that they could respond to this allegation before 
the Commission drafted a final report in which purveyors of pornog-
raphy would be identified.  The category of “pornography” was not 
limited to constitutionally unprotected obscenity but included consti-
tutionally protected sexually explicit material.208
Taking a cue from these episodes,209 advocates for the deterrence 
of hate speech might consider soliciting the Department of Justice 
(or some other agency) to undertake a non-prosecutorial investiga-
tion of incidents of hate speech.  While the Department already in-
vestigates and prosecutes crimes involving hateful language and mo-
tivated by discrimination, it cannot prosecute hate speech on its own 
when not linked to criminal activity.  A “hate speech commission” 
could, however, single out speakers who used hate speech for investi-
gation and public exposure.  Being named by such a commission as 
someone who uses hate speech, or as an organization or company 
that promotes or countenances it, would presumably cause significant 
reputational harms.  This intervention could therefore deter hate 
speech, as well as contribute to a climate of disapprobation of it. 
Such non-binding agency actions are constitutionally permissi-
ble—even if they target protected First Amendment activity—so long 
as they do not entail any concrete sanctions.  In Penthouse International 
207 Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1235024659.shtml (Feb. 19, 2009, 01:24 EST). 
208 See Penthouse Int’l v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011, 1012–14 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
209 Similarly, in Block v. Meese, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Department of Justice’s practice, 
authorized by the Foreign Agents Registration Act, of classifying certain films distributed 
by entities designated as “foreign agents” under the Act as “political propaganda.” 793 
F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  Then-Circuit Judge Scalia wrote, “[w]e know of no case 
in which the first amendment has been held to be implicated by governmental action 
consisting of no more than governmental criticism of the speech’s content.  Nor does any 
case suggest that uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate consists of debate from 
which the government is excluded, or an uninhibited marketplace of ideas one in which 
the government’s wares cannot be advertised.”  Id. at 1313 (quotation marks omitted). 
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v. Meese, the D.C. Circuit found that the actions of the Meese Com-
mission did not violate the First Amendment because the publishers 
were not threatened with prosecution.210  Such a course of action 
crosses the line into unconstitutionality when it appears either that 
there is no factual basis for listing someone as having engaged in the 
disapproved kind of speech211 or when the agency action veers too 
close to threatening or actually bringing about prosecution.212  To 
withstand constitutional challenge, then, non-binding agency actions 
must not only stop short of imposing any sanctions, they must also 
steer clear of collaboration with any government body that might 
bring a prosecution, and they must ensure that any findings they 
make public have an adequately established basis in fact. 
Similar to the activities of the Meese Commission, but presenting 
different doctrinal questions, are investigations undertaken by Con-
gress.  In addition to its power to legislate, Congress has the power to 
conduct investigations213 and to issue reports.214  Congress’s investiga-
tive power was notoriously abused in the 1950s by the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), which, under the vindictive 
210 “At least when the government threatens no sanction—criminal or otherwise—we very 
much doubt that the government’s criticism or effort to embarrass the distributor threat-
ens anyone’s First Amendment rights,” the court wrote.  939 F. 2d at 1016.  “[I]t cannot 
reasonably be said that appellant had a clearly established constitutional right to be free of 
such deliberate and calculated pressure if no threats of legal sanctions were employed.”  
Id. at 1017. 
211 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (holding that or-
ganizations suspected of Communist sympathies had an actionable claim against arbitrary 
classifcations by the Attorney General). 
212 An injunction was sustained against a state anti-obscenity commission that not only 
threatened people with prosecution but also actually gave names to the police in Bantam 
Books v. Sullivan, despite the fact that the agency in question did not itself impose any 
sanctions.  372 U.S. 58 (1963).  The Supreme Court wrote:  “[T]hough the Commission is 
limited to informal sanctions—the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of 
coercion, persuasion, and intimidation—the record amply demonstrates that the Com-
mission deliberately set about to achieve the suppression of publications deemed ‘objec-
tionable’ and succeeded in its aim.  We are not the first court to look through forms to 
the substance and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circula-
tion of publications to warrant injunctive relief.”  Id. at 67.
213 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the Congress to con-
duct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”). 
214 Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution provides that “[e]ach House shall keep a Journal 
of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5.  
In addition, Congress may, free from judicial interference or restraint, publish reports or 
statements.  See Methodist Fed’n for Soc. Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 731 
(D.D.C. 1956) (stating that “nothing in the Constitution authorizes anyone to prevent . . . 
Congress from publishing any statement”).  But see Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 
(D.D.C. 1970) (holding that the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents 
may be enjoined from publishing a report when that report would impinge upon the 
First Amendment rights of individuals and bears no relation to any legislative purpose). 
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stewardship of Senator Joseph McCarthy, subpoenaed and interro-
gated suspected Communists and Communist sympathizers.  Non-
government organizations then compiled “blacklists” of the names of 
those who had admitted to being members of or associated with the 
Communist Party and, often, the names of those who simply refused 
to testify.  People who were blacklisted were often subsequently un-
able to find work.215  The government also issued publications of its 
own warning against the Communist threat, in some cases naming 
particular organizations as likely fronts for Communist activities.216
It would be possible to use these same powers to combat hate 
speech.  Congress could form a standing committee which could use 
its investigative powers to inquire into the scope and nature of the 
problem.  Such a committee could issue reports that the government 
would then pay to publish and distribute.  To the extent that Con-
gress accomplished these tasks without naming individuals and spe-
cific organizations, its activities would likely be uncontroversial and 
would resemble precatory speech in most relevant aspects.  But Con-
gress could also go further by compiling lists of organizations, publi-
cations, and individuals that promulgate hate speech and disseminat-
ing those lists.  Targeting speakers more specifically would obviously 
be a more powerful weapon against hate speech than making gener-
alized statements about the problem.  Those singled out would be 
burdened with the opprobrium of government accusation and, to the 
extent that members of their own communities disapprove of hateful 
language, with the censure of their peers, customers, employees, 
members, or potential readers.  A hate speech “blacklist” could create 
powerful incentives to refrain from using inflammatory, discrimina-
tory language. 
Despite the near-universal condemnation of HUAC and McCarthy 
era anti-Communist tactics, no doctrinal rule prevents Congress from 
dusting them off for use again.  The Speech or Debate Clause and 
separation of powers concerns protect Congress from liability for or 
injunction against anything it might publish so long as the publica-
tion is reasonably related to a legislative objective.217  The Supreme 
215 Histories of the McCarthy era abound.  For a concise recent summary, see Daniel J. 
Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous:  From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
65, 70–73 (2006). 
216 In one case, for example, the government issued a pamphlet called “The Communist Par-
ty of the United States—What It Is—How It Works—A Handbook For Americans,” which 
named the Methodist Federation for Social Action as a religious front for the Communist 
Party.  See Methodist Fed’n, 141 F. Supp. at 730 (describing the contents of said pamphlet). 
217 See Methodist Fed’n, 141 F. Supp at 731 (“By express provision of the Constitution, mem-
bers of Congress, ‘for any Speech or Debate in either House . . . shall not be questioned 
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Court has similarly held that Congress has broad investigative pow-
ers.218  These powers are not unlimited:  both publications and inves-
tigations must be related and in furtherance of a legitimate legislative 
task.219  In Watkins v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned the 
conviction for contempt of Congress of a witness who had refused, 
before HUAC, to answer questions about his past activities.  Chief Jus-
tice Warren’s opinion recognized that First Amendment rights can be 
infringed by non-criminal investigative activity—merely calling some-
one as a witness to testify, he observed, can have a chilling effect on 
speech.220  When First Amendment freedoms are endangered by a 
Congressional investigation, courts will read the committee’s charter 
narrowly and limit its power to issue compulsory process to those sub-
jects properly within its purview.221  In Hentoff v. Ichord, a district court 
applied a similar analysis to the publication of a report by the House 
Committee on Internal Security that listed the names of members of 
“revolutionary” groups (such as the Black Panther Party, Students for 
a Democratic Society, and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee) along with the names of institutions where they had 
in any other Place.’  It would be paradoxical if members could be questioned in any other 
place for statements in a document which both houses have ordered published.”) (inter-
nal citation omitted); EMERSON, supra note 25, at 702–03 (discussing Methodist Federation 
and legislative immunity generally). 
218 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (“The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inher-
ent in the legislative process.  That power is broad.  It encompasses inquiries concerning 
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.  It in-
cludes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of 
enabling the Congress to remedy them.  It comprehends probes into departments of the 
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”). 
219 Id. (holding that Congress has “no general authority to expose the private affairs of indi-
viduals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. . . . Nor is the Con-
gress a law enforcement or trial agency.  These are functions of the executive and judicial 
departments of government.  No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in 
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”); see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (explaining the parameters of the “legitimate legislative 
sphere”). 
220 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197–98 (“The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to 
testify, against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of gov-
ernmental interference.  And when those forced revelations concern matters that are un-
orthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the 
witness may be disastrous. . . . That this impact is partly the result of non-governmental 
activity by private persons cannot relieve the investigators of their responsibility for initiat-
ing the reaction.”). 
221 In Watkins, the court held that petitioner could not be convicted under a federal criminal 
statute for refusing to comply with an order issued by Congress because the underlying 
mission of HUAC was defined too vaguely; witnesses would be unable to determine when 
their questioners were acting within the scope of the committee’s proper authority and 
when they had exceeded it.  Id. at 201–16. 
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been invited to speak and the amount of any honoraria they had 
been paid.222  Finding that the report served no legitimate legislative 
end but rather was avowedly intended “to inhibit further speech on 
college campuses by those listed individuals” and others of similar po-
litical inclination, the court, while conceding that it lacked the au-
thority to enjoin the publication of the list in the Congressional Re-
cord or by members of Congress, did enjoin its publication for wider 
distribution by the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Docu-
ments.223  In order to fall safely within the realm of constitutionally 
permissible action, then, any investigative activities of a Congressional 
committee, as well as ensuing publications, should fall well within a 
clearly-worded authorization from Congress.  Assuming that they did 
so, however, they should pass First Amendment scrutiny and would 
be a powerful weapon. 
All of these forms of advisory and investigatory government ex-
pression verge on the regulation and punishment of speech.  The 
sole difference between such measures and outright prohibitions on 
speech is that the government, having articulated a norm, relies upon 
other actors—either the speaker herself or the general public—to en-
force that norm through censorship and retribution.  Looked at an-
other way, however, these are simply more directed forms of preca-
tory speech.  As the D.C. Circuit stated in Penthouse International v. 
Meese, “[a]s part of the duties of their office, [government] officials 
surely must be expected to be free to speak out to criticize practices, 
even in a condemnatory fashion, that they might not have the statu-
tory or even constitutional authority to regulate.”224
III.  ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 
The foregoing Part has presented a menu of options, some of 
which will no doubt be found by some readers to be unpalatable.  All 
of them are constitutionally permissible, however, as long as certain 
limits are observed.  The remaining task is to assess their desirability 
as a matter of policy.  Because the path proposed is intermediate, 
both the free speech and the anti-subordination camps are likely to 
raise objections. Using government speech to deliberately deter hate 
speech may go too far for First Amendment absolutists and not far 
enough for those who wish for strong measures regulating speech in 
order to promote equality.  These anticipated objections will be ad-
222 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1180–82 (D.D.C. 1970). 
223 Id. at 1182. 
224 939 F.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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dressed in turn.  At the same time that this Part will address practical 
concerns about efficacy and freedom of expression, however, part of 
its goal is to reconsider, on the one hand, the assumption that regula-
tion is a uniquely effective way to intervene against hate speech, and 
on the other hand, the assumption that the First Amendment will 
trump equality concerns once we are outside the context of regula-
tion. 
Before beginning this discussion, it is important to acknowledge 
one objection with which this Article will not engage at length:  that 
hate speech, as mere language, plays only a negligible role in per-
petuating inequality, so that the very enterprise of attempting to 
combat it is irrelevant.  This Article takes the relationship between 
language and subordination to be mutually sustaining:  the power of 
language to wound derives from the reality of subordination, while 
subordination is made present, again and again—and thus perpetu-
ated—through the use of denigrating language.  No attempt is made 
to persuade readers who reject this premise in its entirety to change 
their views. 
This assumption also bears on the question of how interventions 
against hate speech might work.  If one accepts the premise that hate 
speech, in order to work its harms, depends on a complex relation-
ship between linguistic conventions and past and present actual sub-
ordination, then it follows that those harms can be combated not on-
ly directly but indirectly.  On the one hand, the government can take 
steps intended to deter individuals from engaging in this type of 
speech by simply trying to establish a norm that it is wrong.  It can 
signify to speakers that other members of their community find the 
speech reprehensible or otherwise detract from its appeal.  On the 
other hand, the government can take steps intended to undermine 
the power that this kind of speech has—in other words, to intervene 
somehow in the system of signification that allows an individual 
speaker to call on the shared history of inequality and violence that 
makes hateful speech so particularly wounding.  The two kinds of in-
tervention may not be equally effective in bringing about an immedi-
ate reduction in the incidence of hate speech, but for various reasons 
the most effective tactics may not be the most desirable. 
A.  Anti-Subordination Concerns 
The two primary complaints that can be expected from the anti-
subordination camp are:  first, that government speech is inadequate 
as a form of intervention; and, second, that such measures will, to 
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varying degrees, promote backlash as perceived instances of the gov-
ernment favoring “special interest” groups. 
The argument of inadequacy is straightforward:  because govern-
ment speech, in all of the forms listed above, attaches no actual sanc-
tion to hate speech, it cannot be as effective as regulation.  There are 
already fairly well-established social norms against the use of racist, 
homophobic, and misogynistic epithets and symbols; what we need, 
the argument will go, is not more toothless assertions that citizens 
should tolerate diversity but instead meaningful prohibitions backed 
by the coercive power of the state.  And even conceding that censor-
ship can never fully achieve its aim—that the speech that the gov-
ernment bans will never be wholly eradicated—the very fact that gov-
ernment actors are unwilling to back up their imprecations to speak 
respectfully with the real power of legislation may itself undermine 
the anti-hate speech message.225
This critique will be directed especially forcefully at those forms of 
government speech that promise no specific benefit and establish no 
rule.  Precatory government speech is already routine, as the flurry of 
public condemnations of noose incidents by executive and legislative 
officials shows.  Perhaps at best it is an echo of sentiments already 
voiced by others in the community; or it is obligatory, rote, or worse, 
cynical grandstanding.  Commemorative speech celebrating diversity, 
it can be argued, has also become a familiar fact of life without alter-
ing the realities of discrimination in this country.  Moreover, it is at 
best an indirect way of getting at the problem of hate speech.  There 
are too many steps between seeing Sacajawea on a gold dollar coin 
and deciding to expurgate one’s vocabulary of racial slurs. 
In the educational realm, too, one might assert that schools have 
been speaking the language of diversity for many years without mak-
ing an appreciable difference in the attitudes of students.  Students 
take their cues about what is acceptable from their peers and families, 
not from educators.  While in a limited number of cases students who 
use hateful speech may simply be ignorant of the full implications of 
the words and symbols they use, many of the students (and future cit-
izens) who do so may already be alienated from their school as well as 
their community and therefore disinclined to take to heart lessons 
about civil discourse.  In general, school education initiatives aimed 
at altering behavior have uncertain prospects of success, as the persis-
225 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 592 (1996) 
(arguing that the lack of public support for non-incarceratory criminal sanctions is due to 
the widespread sense that alternative sanctions fail to adequately express condemnation). 
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tence of drug use and unplanned pregnancies among adolescents at-
test.226
While these arguments that precatory and commemorative speech 
and educational initiatives will be inefficacious pose significant chal-
lenges, they perhaps depend on an overly simple view of how both 
regulations and government speech interact with social and linguistic 
norms.  To begin with, arguments of inadequacy presumably would 
contrast government speech with the harder-hitting measure of out-
right prohibition.  But this argument begs the question of how effec-
tive regulation itself is, in practice, when there is a public appetite for 
the banned expression.227  As Michael Holquist has observed, censor-
ship creates a sophisticated audience that reads for what is absent as 
much as what is present in a text.228  Regulation alone can never ban-
ish the specter of the disapproved meaning, but rather always invokes 
it.229  Indeed, a prohibition on a sign can increase its power, as the 
frisson of the broken rule becomes inseparably part of the meaning 
of violating a taboo.  One might posit that the closer to universal a 
ban on using a word or symbol becomes, the more powerfully shock-
ing the use of that word or symbol is.  Moreover, battles over regulat-
ing hate speech, at their highest pitch, are understood by those who 
resist regulation as struggles not for the right to inflict injury through 
language but rather as struggles over the basic validity of a group’s 
viewpoint.  As we have seen, for example, some of the most hard-
fought recent battles have been over the right of Christian students to 
forcefully express the view that homosexuality is a sin.  An outright 
ban on hate speech risks enhancing the urgency with which the cen-
226 See, e.g., Laura Beil, Abstinence Education Faces an Uncertain Future, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, 
at A1 (reporting that while rates of abstinence among teenagers have risen in recent 
years, it is not clear that the change is due to the millions of dollars of federal money 
spent over the same period on abstinence programs in schools). 
227 Efforts to regulate child pornography, for example, suggest that success will only be par-
tial.  Even as Congress has expanded the legal tools available for prosecuting child por-
nography-related offenses and enhanced penalties in this area, see, e.g., United States v. 
Morace, No. 09-4007, 2010 WL 476655, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 11, 2010) (noting this trend), 
the business of purveying child pornography has grown, see, e.g., Robert D. Richards & 
Clay Calvert, Untangling Child Pornography from the Adult Entertainment Industry:  An Inside 
Look at the Industry’s Efforts to Protect Minors, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 511, 513 (2008) (noting es-
timates that Internet sales of child pornography currently amount to $3 billion per year 
and are continuing to grow). 
228 Michael Holquist, Corrupt Originals:  The Paradox of Censorship, 109 PMLA 14, 14 (1994). 
229 See id. at 17 (“Any act of censorship, like any sign, is riven in its heart by a fatal division:  
the prohibition that separates what is banned from what is permitted also fuses them; the 
signifying sound and the signified meaning are at once divided and joined within the lin-
guistic sign.  Censorship and the sign are each constructed out of two different things 
that have in common only the necessity to occur together.”). 
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sored group asserts its views—since the group perceives that its very 
legitimacy in the public realm is at stake—and this may foster the 
persistent use of hateful language. 
And at the same time, a dismissal of precatory government speech 
as routine and cynical is too facile.  As the Supreme Court has ob-
served, speech by elected officials is a crucial element of democratic 
accountability.230  What politicians say (and fail to say) in response to 
incidents involving hateful language will be weighed by citizens when 
the next elections come around.  Statements by elected officials on 
the topic of hate speech might occasion fierce debates over the 
meaning of symbols and the seriousness of the harm they inflict, a 
process that could itself help create a climate in which citizens treat 
hateful words and symbols with more caution.  Perhaps more subtly, 
citizens expect that politicians will not take a stand censuring a given 
viewpoint unless it is held by a decided minority.  The precatory 
speech of elected officials is therefore understood to reflect back to 
the public its own preferences.  This kind of government speech, the 
public understands, will only occur if it is politically sayable.  The po-
litically sayable, in turn, stands in a complex, interdependent rela-
tionship with the socially sayable, which in turn stands in a complex, 
interdependent relationship with actual subordination. 
It may be true that politicians will say little that they do not know, 
in advance, commands the support of the majority of their constitu-
ency.  On the other hand, an elected official’s willingness to speak 
out against hate speech will signal to her constituents that she has ma-
jority support for her viewpoint.  The “silent majority” will then find it 
harder to believe that it is indeed a majority.  The effect of elected of-
ficials articulating their opposition to hateful language may be to 
erode the sense of tacit consensus on which speakers who deploy it 
must ultimately rely.  The potential effectiveness of such interven-
tions may be greater when directed at hate speech against groups that 
have made less progress toward full equality.  Precatory statements 
against hate speech by elected officials draw less attention and are 
more likely to appear banal when the sentiment expressed is already 
widely acknowledged as correct.  Speech against racism has perhaps 
become a political commonplace.  But the same cannot be said of 
speech against homophobia.  Imagine the public reaction if President 
Bush had spoken out consistently against anti-gay hate speech, stand-
230 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“[O]f course, a gov-
ernment entity is ultimately accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy. . . . If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some dif-
ferent or contrary position.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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ing shoulder-to-shoulder with gay-rights activists and calling on citi-
zens for toleration of same-sex relationships and gender non-
conforming individuals.  Such precatory speech would have prompt-
ed an outcry and threats of political recriminations, but also, one 
hopes, it would have caused a reevaluation, in some quarters, of the 
hierarchy that classes LGBT individuals as inferior. 
Nor should the possibility that Americans might be influenced by 
precatory speech on the subject of race-based hate speech be dis-
missed out of hand.  One might well be skeptical when a President 
with an undistinguished record of promoting civil rights231 takes the 
occasion of a commemoration of the career of a distinguished and 
popular civil rights activist to speak out against a hate speech contro-
versy that erupted in the world of professional golf.  But stirring 
words from a president possessed of great moral authority might well 
be expected to have some effect on the language habits of the citi-
zenry.  (Consider, as a portent of what is possible in this regard, then-
presidential candidate Barack Obama’s widely praised speech about 
race relations in America.232) 
These same arguments extend to the criticism that commemora-
tive speech will be redundant and ineffectual.  The claim is that indi-
viduals who engage in hateful speech often do so with full knowledge 
that the words or symbols they use are disapproved by the community 
at large.  A memorial reminding citizens of the suffering of those on 
the receiving end of prejudice might reinforce a general climate of 
tolerance without having much effect on the pockets of anger and 
prejudice from which hate speech emanates.  But like the words of a 
public official, commemorative speech functions as a representation 
to the community of what its views and values are and of who is a 
member.  When the image presented is one of diversity and toler-
ance, the would-be racist’s confidence in the universality of her views 
may be ever-so-slightly undermined. 
The argument that education will be inefficacious assumes that 
students who engage in hate speech will not respond to any interven-
231 See, e.g., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS EVALUATION, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DRAFT 
REPORT, REDEFINING RIGHTS IN AMERICA:  THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF THE GEORGE W. 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 2001–2004 (2004), available at www.law.umaryland.edu/
marshall/usccr/documents/cr12r24.pdf (recounting President George W. Bush’s civil 
rights record); Charlie Savage, Civil Rights Hiring Shifted in Bush Era, BOSTON GLOBE, July 
23, 2006, at A1 (noting that the Bush administration filled the Justice Department’s Civil 
Rights Division with people with strong conservative leanings and little experience in civil 
rights).
232 See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Urges U.S. to Grapple with Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A1 
(describing the “sweeping assessment of race” in Obama’s speech). 
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tion by their teachers.  This assumption, however, is no more credible 
than the proposition that many young people acquire racist, sexist 
and homophobic views passively, through repeated exposure to dis-
criminatory comments and actions.  Children and adolescents may 
often be imitative, subject to great pressure to conform socially, but 
this does not mean that they are incapable of revising their opinions 
upon receipt of new information.  A well-designed program teaching 
students about the historical facts of discrimination and discrimina-
tory violence and informing them of the connection between the 
words they hear used casually and that history might well lead them 
to rethink the use of hateful language.  Moreover, education about 
hate speech would have the benefit of giving potentially empowering 
information to targets of hate speech.  While no amount of education 
can erase the sting of actual subordination and exclusion, knowledge 
may nevertheless offer the victim some small comfort.  To know that 
such speech is condemned by one’s community and to be enabled to 
think critically about it is surely better than to have no such re-
sources. 
A case can, then, be made that precatory speech, commemorative 
speech, and education would be more effective than one might ini-
tially believe.  Those interventions that one might expect to be more 
forceful, meanwhile—government subsidies, control of non-public 
fora, and advisory and investigatory statements—may in fact be less 
effective than they at first appear.  The government does have signifi-
cant influence over, for example, public employees, and the U.S. 
government is the largest employer in the nation, with two percent of 
the working population on its payroll.233  Add to that the number of 
private employers whose businesses depend on government con-
tracts, and then add the number of organizations who would benefit 
from a tax incentive, and the potential impact of instituting anti-hate 
speech rules in non-public fora and incentives to create anti-hate 
speech educational programs begins to appear formidable. 
A more challenging question, however, is what such measures 
would add to existing discrimination law.  Expression involving burn-
ing crosses and nooses routinely crops up in hostile work environ-
ment claims.234  As courts have applied Title VII, a hostile work envi-
ronment claim is made out by showing a pattern of discriminatory 
233 Federal Jobs Net Career Center, http://federaljobs.net (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
234 See, e.g., Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 520 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2008); Abner v. Kansas 
City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2008); Woodard v. PHB Die Casting, 255 F. App’x 
608 (3d Cir. 2007); Isaac v. N.C. Dep’t. of Transp., 192 F. App’x. 197 (4th Cir. 2006).
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incidents; a single instance of hate speech will not suffice.235  Employ-
ers, however, have significant incentives to prohibit such expression, 
as they will be held liable if an employee successfully establishes a 
hostile work environment claim and, on the other hand, may estab-
lish an affirmative defense to such a claim by, in part, showing that 
they have exercised reasonable care to prevent harassing behavior.236  
Government action prompting the explicit adoption of anti-hate 
speech rules and the implementation of anti-hate speech education 
may add only slightly to these existing incentives.  On the other hand, 
the question of what incremental effect government subsidies and 
strategic regulation of non-public fora will have on hate speech is dif-
ficult to assess without empirical data.  How many workplaces already 
have firm anti-hate speech rules in place?  How many engage in anti-
hate speech education?  It seems unlikely that there is no room what-
soever for expansion of such programs. 
In the case of advisory and investigatory statements, there appears 
at first to be good reason to believe that these measures would be ef-
fective.  Senator McCarthy’s name has become notorious in part be-
cause his enterprise did succeed in punishing numerous individuals 
by ruining their careers and causing them to be socially ostracized.  
The activities of Edwin Meese’s Commission on Pornography led 7-
Eleven stores and other retailers to pull adult magazines from their 
shelves.237  In both of those cases, however, a combination of factors 
was present that may not exist in the case of hate speech:  there was a 
mainstream industry or distribution channel on which the disap-
proved speakers depended for their livelihood (entertainment, in the 
case of the McCarthy blacklist, and publishers and retail stores in the 
case of Meese’s report); the speakers could therefore be influenced 
via the actions of large private entities, such as corporations; and the 
235 See Estlund, supra note 202, at 695–97 (noting that the standard for a hostile work envi-
ronment claim “almost always requires an accumulation of incidents”); cf. Saxe v. State 
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206–11 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing, in the education 
context, the differences between the pattern of incidents involving derogatory speech ne-
cessary to establish a harassment claim under anti-discrimination law and the single in-
stances of speech that could offend an anti-hate speech code). 
236 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Estlund, supra note 
202, at 697–99; Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work 
Environment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305, 310 (1996) (noting that 
“though the law facially imposes liability only when the speech is ‘severe or pervasive,’ in 
practice employers can effectively defend themselves only through zero-tolerance poli-
cies”). 
237 See Matthew L. Wald, “Adult” Magazines Lose Sales as 8,000 Stores Forbid Them, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 1986, at A1. 
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threat of negative public perception or boycott was a powerful influ-
ence on those entities. 
While there are certainly commercial publications, radio shows, 
and websites that frequently use hateful language, it is not clear that 
the purveyors of such expression are so situated that a blacklist could 
in fact significantly harm them.  Fewer of them, perhaps, depend for 
their livelihood on customers who would be shocked to discover that 
they deploy hate speech and would then engage in a boycott.  It 
seems equally likely that this is a self-sustaining niche market. 
In both this case and the case of conditional government subsidies 
and non-public fora, then, the difficulty may be that the norm against 
hate speech that is already in place is doing as much work as it can 
do.  But again, the argument that propaganda and blacklisting would 
be fruitless depends on as-yet-unknown facts.  Diligent research might 
uncover connections between mainstream businesses and hateful 
language that are sufficiently embarrassing to motivate action. 
Another question, however, is whether the mere fact of being 
cited in a government report would have any deterrent effect on us-
ers of hate speech.  This concern also raises the problem of backlash.  
Just as regulation may increase the appetite for hate speech, a com-
prehensive and proactive program of government speech targeting 
hate speech might inflame racial tensions if it were seen as pandering 
or favoritism.  Resentment could fuel more, not less, hate speech.  
This concern is particularly relevant to the more apparently punitive 
types of government intervention:  blacklisting and agency action af-
ter the model of the Meese Commission.  There is good reason to 
pause before recommending the adoption of tactics for which there 
are such ready pejorative labels:  “McCarthyist,” “witch hunt,” and so 
on. 
But the backlash argument can be taken too far. Non-regulatory 
interventions against hate speech have the advantage of being soft, 
rather than hard, rules.  An anti-hate speech “blacklist” would func-
tion as a formal statement of condemnation of those who incite or 
trade on, for example, racial hatred without bringing actual punitive 
sanctions to bear on such persons.  Any effort to deter a particular 
kind of conduct will of course have more complex effects than simply 
reducing its incidence, but in comparison to regulation, government 
speech might be expected to produce less resentment and ensuing 
resistance. 
This brings us back to the question of efficacy.  Eventually, per-
haps, the social system reaches a kind of semiotic equilibrium, where 
the weight of the prohibition (legal or cultural) is balanced by the al-
lure, at the margins, of using the banned speech.  If such an equilib-
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rium has been reached in the case of hate speech—most people 
think it is reprehensible, while a few people feel compelled to engage 
in it, whether for the sake of the shock or because the very consensus 
against it increases the need to push back—then simply reiterating 
disapproval of hate speech will do nothing to reduce its incidence. 
If this is the case, then it might appear that regulation is the only 
satisfactory alternative.  This would be so not because regulation will 
effectively deter hate speech—for we have posited that regulation will 
never quell the appetite for hate speech—but because in the absence 
of the possibility of deterrence, nothing short of punishment will do.  
Society must express its moral disapproval of hateful speech by exact-
ing retribution.  Taking punitive action also conveys to the victim of 
hate speech the message that society recognizes the insult to her dig-
nity that she has suffered and so is an important way to reinforce the 
constitutional value of equality. 
History suggests, however, that the amount of hateful speech does 
fluctuate over time.  Perhaps then we have not reached the moment 
where prohibition and punishment are the only weapons left in our 
arsenal.  The quantity of hate speech might rise or fall because it is an 
imitative behavior, as the spate of noose-related incidents in 2006–
2007 suggests.238  Those forms of government speech that educate cit-
izens about the deeper meaning of hateful language they might use 
casually would perhaps help contain such an epidemic.  The quantity 
of hate speech we experience will also depend on general beliefs 
about the level of prejudice in society and the extent of actual subor-
dination.  While those who speak hatefully do not do so because they 
think society in general approves their speech, they must on some 
level believe that they are reiterating a shared, unspoken belief about 
who is an insider and who is an outsider, who is—or deserves to be—
dominant in the socio-cultural hierarchy and who is subordinate.  
They rely on these assumed truths of status for the effect of their 
speech.  So those forms of government intervention that subvert or 
238 The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate crimes, noted that after the much-
publicized events in Jena, Louisiana, the number of incidents involving nooses spiked, go-
ing from twelve or so a year to roughly seventy.  Michael Abramowitz & Hamil R. Harris, 
At Black History Month Event, Bush Denounces Noose Displays, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2008, at 
A2.  Filings of claims of racial harassment with the EEOC increased 24% in the same year 
as the “Jena 6” incident.  The EEOC’s Chairwoman Naomi Earp commented that al-
though the agency does not keep statistics breaking down harassment incidents accord-
ing to the language and symbols used, nooses seemed more prevalent in such incidents in 
2007; she speculated that the general rise and the rise in noose displays were due in part 
to the visibility of the Jena case.  Bello, supra note 19. 
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undermine racist speakers’ confidence that they are backed by con-
sensus may also, over time, make a meaningful difference. 
B.  Free Speech Concerns 
The predominant arguments we can expect the free speech camp 
to make are that any intentional manipulation of private speakers’ 
expression by the government is suspect, and that many of the pro-
posed measures go far beyond benign admonition and amount to re-
prehensible, if technically doctrinally permissible, censorship.  Even 
those measures that appear more moderate can cumulatively have a 
stultifying influence on the free and equal exchange of ideas.  Free 
speech advocates have consistently evinced discomfort about the in-
direct effect that precatory and educational government speech has 
on individual expression.  Commentators have worried that the gov-
ernment can distort debate by “drowning out” other voices, given its 
superior funds, the pervasive presence it has in public discourse, and 
the monopoly it often has on channels of communication.239  Without 
suppressing any individual speaker’s viewpoint, the government 
might simply overwhelm it by iterating its own viewpoint more often 
and more loudly.240  While the capacity for the government to domi-
nate public debate is a legitimate source of concern, however, that 
does not mean that all interventions are to be shunned.  When there 
239 EMERSON, supra note 25, at 712 (“[I]t is very easy to visualize situations in which the gov-
ernment’s voice may overwhelm or displace all others and thus seriously distort the sys-
tem of free expression.  This occurs mainly when the government has a monopoly or 
near-monopoly over the media or institutions of communication.”); LEVINSON, supra note 
140, at 80 (“[T]he main threat posed by the state is that it will become an overweening tu-
tor of the public, molding a distinct consciousness, and subtly (or not so subtly) delegiti-
mizing others who would wish to play a similar tutelary role.”). 
240 A few cases have been brought claiming that individuals have a constitutional right of ac-
cess to space in media of communication so that their voices are not overpowered.  The 
Supreme Court, however, has generally been reluctant to mandate access to the media in 
order to guarantee that minority viewpoints are heard.  See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. 
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a statute granting political candidates the 
right to equal space to reply to criticisms by a newspaper violated the First Amendment).  
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that the First Amendment al-
lowed the suppression of speech to prevent the “drowning out” of less powerful voices, at 
least among private speakers.  424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).  “[T]he concept that [the] gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some . . . in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Steven Shiffrin questions whether a “drowning out 
private sources” model can usefully guide courts.  Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 595–601.  
Owen Fiss, on the other hand, believes that the government should take steps to ensure 
that minority and marginalized viewpoints are heard in public debate.  See Fiss, supra note 
187. 
1184 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
is an affirmative constitutional value to promote—here, equality—we 
should perhaps be more bold when treading in the shadow of the 
First Amendment. 
To begin with, even the most coercive forms of government 
speech can be defended from a First Amendment perspective.  Advi-
sory and investigatory speech, when it relies on the marketplace and 
economic pressures to achieve its goal of deterring speech, can be 
understood as simply filling an information gap in order to allow 
consumers to bestow their money and time on speakers with whom 
they do not have a major ideological difference.  In the 1950s, for ex-
ample, sentiment in the marketplace of ideas was strongly anti-
Communist, so that being identified as a Communist or Communist 
sympathizer made it difficult to obtain work, but this was arguably 
merely a logical effect of majority sentiment.  Looked at one way, a 
blacklist facilitates the matching of sentiment against a viewpoint with 
speakers who espouse it.241  If, in retrospect, the anti-Communist feel-
ing of the time appears paranoid and hysterical, this may be best un-
derstood as a failing of the citizenry rather than a failure to enforce 
the Constitution.  The First Amendment is strongly countermajori-
tarian in that it protects speakers from punishment when they ex-
press universally reviled, hateful views.  Need the Constitution go fur-
ther and protect such speakers from all adverse consequences that 
follow upon maintaining a deeply unpopular viewpoint?  If not, does 
the Constitution prevent the government from facilitating the major-
ity’s expression of disapproval? 
These questions are not easy.  At the root of free speech advo-
cates’ discomfort with such interventions is a basic unease with the 
prospect of the government intentionally favoring or disfavoring any 
single viewpoint.  The government has a unique ability to control 
what we know and to mold the norms that govern social and political 
life.  Through activities such as disseminating or withholding infor-
mation, defining school curricula, or selecting the subjects of public 
monuments, the government can influence citizens’ perception of 
the facts of their world, of what is normal behavior and what is aber-
rant, of which values are endorsed and which are disfavored, of who 
is a member of the polity and who is not.  Commentators addressing 
241 Indeed, Martin Redish has recently published a study of HUAC and McCarthy-era tactics 
such as blacklisting that concludes, contrary to received opinion, that there are strong 
First Amendment arguments in favor of them.  In particular, the blacklists that were 
maintained by non-government parties represented an exercise of those parties’ First 
Amendment rights to free expression and association.  MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF 
PERSECUTION:  FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA (2005). 
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government speech have almost universally expressed concern that 
this kind of expressive activity can amount to a kind of thought con-
trol.242  As Levinson, MacKinnon, and others have observed, outright 
censorship has grown increasingly rare, but the government retains 
the power to instantiate an orthodoxy of opinion and values through 
non-prohibitive means.243  This power is arguably greater precisely 
because it does not take the form of an outright prohibition that can 
be openly critiqued and defied. 
It has proved exceedingly difficult to use legal doctrine, or indeed 
any means, to rein in the manipulative effects of such expression.  
The very ubiquity of government expression is both a source of its po-
tency and one guarantee of its immunity from First Amendment re-
straints.  The government provides information to the citizenry 
through myriad channels, including public education, subsidies for 
and regulation of the media, congressional and agency findings of 
fact, selective transmission of information about government activi-
ties, and so on.  The constant flow of this information could hardly be 
staunched without a radical transformation of the role of govern-
ment, and even filtering it—assuming we could agree on the standard 
to be used in a filtering process—would seem to require a shadow 
government whose job was to assess the content of all government 
communications. 
But even accepting that it is not possible to monitor all govern-
ment speech for viewpoint-neutrality, it is perhaps offensive to free 
speech values to undertake a programmatic government effort to 
quell a specific viewpoint.  This is, in essence, the principle articu-
lated in Justice Blackmun’s Pico concurrence:  the First Amendment 
abhors a government intent to suppress speech.244  One might retort 
242 Mark Yudof makes this point most fully.  “Substantial dangers lurk, even in democratic 
countries, in government’s sweeping power to communicate. . . . There is the danger that 
government communications will be employed to falsify consent.  In a democratic polity, 
it is one thing to employ mass communications to implement decisions that in some loose 
sense represent the majority will.  It is quite another thing to attempt to fashion a majority 
will through uncontrolled indoctrination activities.  The line is a blurred one.”  YUDOF, 
supra note 120, at 15; see also Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 568; Bezanson & Buss, supra note 
25, at 1491–96. 
243 LEVINSON, supra note 140, at 80–81; MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 77. 
244 See also YUDOF, supra note 120, at 15, 164–73 (arguing that government speech should be 
designed to enhance autonomous decision making by citizens, while—as difficult as it 
may be in practice to make this distinction—government speech that tends to undermine 
citizens’ ability to make well-informed and independent choices should be avoided or 
suppressed); Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 27, at 185 (noting our discomfort with gov-
ernment “decision rules” that are inconsistent with the ideal that there should be a free 
marketplace of ideas). 
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that as government “thought control” is inevitable, it is better to be 
explicit about the agenda being promoted.  More cynically, one 
could claim that it is pointless for the Left, in contrast to the Right (as 
exemplified by, for instance, Edwin Meese), to be squeamish about 
deploying the government’s resources  to instantiate an orthodoxy of 
opinion.  Such responses, however, paper over real dissimilarities that 
may be of constitutional moment.  There is a large difference be-
tween accepting that all of our information and opinions are to some 
degree influenced by government action—that the “state of nature” 
form of political discourse is unrecoverable245—and attempting to 
implement a unified program of indoctrination.  It may be infinitely 
more tolerable to live under a set of somewhat ramshackle institu-
tions working at cross purposes ineffectually than to live under an ef-
ficient and undivided power.  (The design of our system of govern-
ment—which is characterized by federalism and separation of 
powers—is predicated on this belief.)  By the same token, the hap-
hazard effect of government action on speech is perhaps preferable 
to deliberate manipulation.246
All of these concerns flow from a generalized commitment to free 
speech.  But First Amendment values are not the only ones at stake in 
the particular case of hate speech.  On the other side of the argu-
ment is the Fourteenth Amendment value of equality.  Concerns 
245 See TUSSMAN, supra note 26, at 93–99 (discussing the ways in which the “free” public fo-
rum is constituted by government actions). 
246 Not everyone would agree.  There has been a recent surge of interest, led by Cass Sun-
stein and Richard Thaler, in what they call “libertarian paternalism.”  Their argument, 
which aims to redeem the concept of paternalism, departs from the recognition that the 
environment in which individuals make choices—choices that in theory should be gov-
erned strictly by their preferences—is already structured by government action to influ-
ence their decisions.  The existing default rule—to use one of Sunstein and Thaler’s ex-
amples, whether enrolling in an employee savings plan requires opting in or whether it is 
automatic and employees can opt out—will influence conduct, regardless of which way it 
is set.  Since there is no truly neutral position for the state to take, they ask, why should it 
not set the default rule in the way that it believes will conduce to the best choices?  Cass 
R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1159, 1159–60 (2003).  Lawrence Lessig has pointed out that the law can set “default 
rules” in the realm of social meaning:  laws can alter the significance of certain actions by 
mandating behavior.  Lessig uses the example of laws requiring individuals to wear seat-
belts:  the choice to wear a seatbelt can signify an insulting lack of trust in one’s driver if it 
is free, while if the law mandates seatbelt use putting one on becomes an ambiguous ges-
ture—it might be motivated by fear of the driver’s incompetence, or it might be moti-
vated by desire to avoid a fine—and so it is deprived of its insulting force.  Lawrence Les-
sig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 998–1000 (1995).  One can 
imagine applying Sunstein and Thaler’s method to social meaning:  systematically explor-
ing which laws tend, through such “default setting,” to reinforce discrimination and the 
use of hateful language and altering them. 
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about deliberate government influence on speech through means 
that are constitutionally permissible fall into the penumbra of the 
First Amendment rather than striking at its center.  This is territory, 
certainly, where the First Amendment commends caution.  But with 
good reason, may we not venture forward?  There are real differences 
among the values that one might seek to instantiate through pro-
grammatic government expression.  The question, “Should the gov-
ernment use its speech to try to discourage the view that unborn fe-
tuses are persons?” demands a different kind of analysis from the 
question, “Should the government use its speech to try to promote 
equality and tolerance?”247  As an initial matter, the value of equality is 
constitutionally recognized.  Moreover, tolerance is arguably not a 
substantive value but a practice that is a condition of democracy.  And 
in this sense, the First Amendment too would be served by interven-
tion.248  Without tolerance and equality, debates in general about 
other substantive issues of public concern will be hampered. 
On this view, the principles articulated by Justice Blackmun in Pico 
or by the district court in Hentoff v. Ichord sweep too broadly.  It is not 
the case that wherever the government intends to quiet a particular 
group of speakers the Constitution is offended.  Nor would it neces-
sarily be true that, wherever an act of government expression is un-
dertaken “with the hope and expectation that [other citizens] would 
bring social and economic pressures” to bear to discourage a group 
of speakers,249 a court should intervene.  Rather, the determination of 
whether the First Amendment compels us to disapprove such gov-
ernment expression—as a matter of principle no less than as a matter 
of doctrine—would depend on exactly what value the government 
sought to promote.  When it is another constitutional value, First 
Amendment concerns should not be allowed alone to dictate our 
conclusion. 
IV.  CONCLUSION:  WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? 
It is time to draw some conclusions.  The pragmatic policy rec-
ommendations this Article will make are relatively straightforward:  
precatory government speech, commemorative speech, and educa-
247 See YUDOF, supra note 120, at 54 (arguing that schools should promote critical thinking 
and “such values as tolerance, civility, liberty, equality, respect for individual dignity, par-
ticipation in political decisions, freedom of expression, freedom to own and dispose of 
property, and respect for minority interests”); see also TUSSMAN, supra note 26, at 51–85 
(arguing that the government should use its “teaching power” to inculcate civic virtues). 
248 See supra, notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
249 Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1970). 
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tion should all be used more extensively as means of intervening 
against hate speech.  The free speech concerns weighing against their 
use are weak:  none attach a benefit or detriment to the content of 
speech.  Of these three, precatory speech and education have per-
haps the most unexplored potential.  As we have seen, the category of 
precatory speech is not limited to condemnatory sound bites; it in-
cludes a number of ways that the government branches spur one an-
other to action and help forge consensus about the nature of social 
practices and values.  It may also, over time, actually shift the ground 
under the hateful speaker’s feet, robbing her of her confidence that 
she can invoke an entire system of subordination by using a few 
cheap words.  And education offers a crucial opportunity to counter-
act the spread of hateful language through unreflective imitation and 
absorption of discriminatory attitudes.  Fitfully, the government is al-
ready using both of these modes of expression to counteract the 
problem of hate speech.  A more focused, consistent, and self-aware 
approach can enhance the efficacy of these interventions. 
The strategic use of government subsidies and the regulation of 
non-public fora to prevent hate speech could also be explored more 
fully.  In the examples considered—workplace rules and education 
programs—it was not clear that this tactic would significantly alter ex-
isting practices.  But there may be other areas in which there is more 
ground to be gained. 
When it comes to the most apparently coercive forms of govern-
ment speech—advisory and investigatory statements—the benefits 
may not outweigh the detriments.  As discussed above, there are 
weighty First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment arguments in 
favor of creating, for example, a congressional committee charged 
with investigating and identifying those who promote hatred towards 
a given subordinated class.  On the other hand, history suggests that 
such measures would be divisive and could conduce to a climate of 
paranoia and mutual accusation.  The business of using the platform 
of government speech to name names and issue warnings would also, 
most likely, be messy:  non-judicial government actors are not bound 
to follow the rules of procedure that have been developed in the 
courts to promote accurate fact-finding and guard against partiality.  
For all of these reasons, as a practical matter, this last category of gov-
ernment expression seems best avoided as a means of intervening 
against hate speech. 
Beyond these pragmatic observations, there are more general 
points to make.  This Article began with a consideration of the im-
passe that the debate between the anti-subordination camp and the 
free speech camp had reached.  In exploring a middle way, the fore-
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going discussion has also sought to question some of the basic as-
sumptions of each side.  On the anti-subordination side, the emphasis 
on regulation should be reevaluated.  Punitive government action 
may offer retribution for the harm suffered by a victim of hate 
speech; but regulation is, at the same time, a crude intervention in 
the complex and subtle relationship between language and subordi-
nation.  It is not the only, and may not be the most effective, way to 
combat hate speech.  On the free speech side, we must recognize that 
if a deliberate government intervention against a particular kind of 
expression raises constitutional concerns, so too does government 
passivity in the face of linguistic acts that perpetuate subordination 
and inequality.  The clash between the First Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been resolved in the First Amendment’s 
favor in the area of regulation.  Outside that core area, a compromise 
may be in order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
